The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
How has the advent of nuclear weapons affected the politics of decision-making and control in military alliances? Existing theory of alliance politics—and, in particular, the logic of the alliance security dilemma—is largely derived from the experiences of European states in the pre-nuclear era. As a result, scholars assume that whether or not alliances face the prospect of nuclear-armed conflict is incidental to the management of fears of military abandonment and entrapment among their member states. By critically examining this "conventional assumption" in existing accounts, this presentation seeks to develop a new basis for analyzing contemporary military alliances and predicting their cohesion, durability, and structure.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.