The United States has been the dominant global economic power throughout the 20th century, and its geopolitical isolation in the Western Hemisphere gives it a high level of natural security. Why, given these essentially constant structural conditions, American grand strategy has varied so dramatically over time? Why has the United States at some times made costly commitments abroad that have a dubious security rationale, while at other times seeking retrenchment and restraint during periods of great geopolitical threat?

This seminar will offer a theory explaining variation in American commitments based on two variables: the character of American liberalism at home and the balance of power overseas. Different types of liberal preferences interact with different power configurations to produce distinct grand strategies. After outlining this theory, Mr. Green will then apply it to an under-theorized case of strategic change: the transition in American Cold War Grand Strategy between the Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy administrations.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.