The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
States commonly employ a divide and conquer strategy against violent nonstate actors, aiming to fragment terrorist groups, shatter their organizational networks, and compel existing members to renounce violence. Surprisingly, there has been little systematic analysis of precisely how internal splintering affects the trajectories of terrorist organizations and why the subsequent splinter groups develop in particular ways. This presentation highlights a new theory of organizational fragmentation that ultimately connects the different causes of group splintering with particular outcomes, and it presents preliminary evidence on the development of terrorist splinter organizations over time.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.