The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Under what conditions does acquiring nuclear weapons embolden weak states to do things they otherwise would not have done against their stronger adversaries? How frequently can we expect these conditions to obtain? And how severe will the results be when they do? This seminar will lay out the emerging conventional wisdom that acquisition has emboldened and will embolden states such as Iran; replace this flawed argument with a logically complete and less pessimistic competitor; and evaluate both in light of evidence from the crucial case of Pakistan.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.