The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Where is the consistency in the post–Cold War response to U.S. primacy? Why does it vary, not only by which European allies are supportive of the U.S. foreign policy agenda, but also by the timing and means of support? In sum, the speaker questions how bound to follow U.S. allies are with the aim of providing an explanation of cooperation between allies in the post–Cold War international system.
The central argument posed is that part of the logic is to be found in a unipolar alliance security dilemma between the lone superpower, the unipole, and its allies. The central focus taken is on the perspective of the allies. In this perspective, the dilemma consists of the need to choose between two equally unattractive risks, the risk of being abandoned by the unipole in a single option system vs. the risk of being entrapped into costly conflicts. Abandonment by the unipole can lead to both loss in security and influence while entrapment can lead to loss of autonomy for the state and also be costly domestically — politically and economically. It is thus argued that participation in large scale international ad hoc coalitions for U.S. allies generally is determined more by their relation to the unipole and less in their relation to the conflict partners. The formation of the peacekeeping coalition in Lebanon in 2006 is used as an interesting case for studying the degree of EU participation being influenced by their U.S. relations in a non-U.S.-led coalition. The coalition was an obvious and relatively straightforward chance for the EU to prove their worth on the conflict managing scene. The EU did, however not take this opportunity and only reluctantly participated in the UN-led coalition. The speaker argues that by applying the logic of the unipolar alliance security dilemma, the European reluctance can be found exactly in the withdrawn role of the United States.
In sum, the novelty of the project is to fill a void in the realist research program on alliance literature by providing a systematic explanation that uses logic from existing alliance formation and management theory to explain cooperation between allies — in specific ad hoc coalitions formed inside already existing western alliances in a unipolar international system. The empirical added value of the project is by focusing on coalitions as a place to study intra-alliance cooperation providing a better understanding of security cooperation between aligned states in the ever more frequent formation of global ad hoc coalitions.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.
Background reading may be downloaded here (.pdf)