The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Alliance formation and termination among criminal groups entail costs, not only benefits. Why, then, do criminal organizations enter such costly commitments instead of engaging in sporadic, one-off cooperation, and how do they choose their alliance partners among other criminal groups? Based on three critical cases — Mexico, Colombia, and El Salvador — and over 120 interviews conducted with U.S. and foreign government officials as well as former (retired) members of criminal organizations, this seminar presents the first theoretical framework on the formation of alliances among criminal groups.
The argument at the heart of this presentation is that criminal organizations do not choose their allies at random and opportunistically. The costs associated with alliance formation and termination force criminal groups to be selective and differentiate in their choice of allies. This study approaches the topic from an internal conflict perspective and explicitly addresses military cooperation among criminal organizations, moving beyond the traditional firm analogy and the business literature on strategic alliances.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.