Lost in the furor over what Moscow did or did not do, and what effects it did or did not have, is the broader question of what this incident says about Russian intentions and aims. Just how unusual was it for great powers to interfere in a democracy’s electoral processes, and just how outraged should Americans be by the alleged activities?
Speaker: Wooseon Choi, Research Fellow, International Security Program
Many realists such as Hans Morgenthau, Jack Snyder, and Thomas Christensen have argued that the United States and China had a common power interest in countering the Soviet Union, the strongest continental power, during the Cold War. They argue, however, that the United States and China had had a hostile relationship mainly due to American domestic politics until the Nixon administration finally succeeded in overcoming domestic obstacles to make an alliance with China in 1972. They consider U.S.-China relations until 1971 as an important anomaly to balance of power theory. Countering conventional domestic explanations, the speaker presents a structural explanation that U.S.-China relations before and after 1972 are explained by the power structures. He argues that the case long considered as an anomaly actually shows how strongly power structure influences the behaviors of states.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.