The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
Fifty-one years ago, President John F. Kennedy said he was "haunted" by the possibility that "15 or 20 or 25 nations" may acquire nuclear weapons by 1970. "I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard," the President stated. Nuclear weapons have spread much slower than Kennedy feared, but the hard work to contain this danger continues. Saudi Arabia is on record that it will get nuclear weapons if Iran goes nuclear. This seminar will provide a historical overview of U.S. efforts to convince its Cold War–era allies (Taiwan, South Korea, Pakistan, and Israel) from going nuclear. It will then discuss what lessons policymakers can draw as the United States confronts the possibility of contemporary allies, such as Riyadh, considering acquiring nuclear capabilities. "History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme," Mark Twain is said to have observed. Mining history for insights on what factors motivated our allies' nuclear pursuits in the past is important for crafting a smarter nonproliferation policy today.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.