The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
In response to growing concern over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, the Bush administration launched the controversial Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003 with 11 core states — the United States, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Now, five years later, the PSI boasts participation from over 80 states.
The PSI aims to intercept the flow of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to states and non-state actors. However, some critical states remain outside its framework, and it has attracted critics given its informal and loose association — and its creative application of legal principles. This presentation will explore the evolution of the PSI, its structure, reasons for states' participation or nonparticipation, and arguments for and against it becoming more formally tied to other instruments of the nonproliferation regime.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.