The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
This seminar will examine the prospects for further nuclear arms reductions between the United States and Russia, including the possibility that negotiations might be expanded to weapons not limited by the New START Treaty: non-deployed (reserve) strategic warheads and non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons. Given the offense-defense relationship, the seminar will cover U.S. and Russian differences over missile defense and how those might be resolved to allow a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement for Europe. The seminar will also address the challenges that must be overcome to advance the nuclear arms control agenda.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.