Speaker: Nicholas L. Miller, Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

Much conventional wisdom suggests that states with nuclear energy programs are more likely to seek or acquire nuclear weapons. In this seminar, the speaker will argue that the link between nuclear energy programs and proliferation is overstated. While energy programs increase the technical capacity of a state to build nuclear weapons, they also (1) increase the costliness of nonproliferation sanctions, (2) increase the odds that a parallel nuclear weapons program is detected, and (3) reduce the incentives to weaponize by providing a hedging alternative. Collectively, these three mechanisms help explain why states with nuclear energy programs have not been significantly more likely to seek or acquire nuclear weapons historically. 

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.

For more information, email the International Security Program Assistant at susan_lynch@harvard.edu.