The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
A review of the historical record suggests that the American decision to remain in Europe after World War II was taken in the late 1960s and not in the late 1940s, as is commonly assumed. In fact, from 1945 until 1965, the U.S. worked hard to pass the buck for dealing with the Soviet Union to the West Europeans. Why, then, did the U.S. abandon its buck-passing strategy and accept a continental commitment in the late 1960s? The speaker argues that the emerging reality of mutual assured destruction (MAD) persuaded the Americans that the costs of containing the Soviet Union were negligible. Specifically, U.S. policymakers became convinced that, given MAD, it was highly unlikely that they would have to fight another European war. Thus, the United States committed to the continent when doing so was thought to be cheapest and not in the early Cold War when containment was thought to be most costly.
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Please note new location!