Events

Speaker: Julie George, Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program

Under which conditions do dual-use emerging technologies proliferate in the international system? The speaker investigates the likelihood of proliferation of three emerging technologies: artificial intelligence, robotics, and cyber. She selects these three emerging innovations based on their date of discovery in the 1950s and analyze the paths taken by states and the private sector. The outcome variable, proliferation, includes two stages, specifically possession and the operationality of the emerging technology. It is evaluated based on two hypotheses: 1) whether foreign acquisition or indigenous formation is the modal form of technology acquisition and 2) the degree to which there are international institutions governing these technologies. By analyzing neglected patterns that characterize the proliferation of technologies by states and how they have changed from the 1950s to the present, scholars and policymakers gain a greater sense of the liabilities of the innovations to the international system. Overall, scholarly attention to emerging technologies is increasingly important as these innovations continue to take shape and impact the nature of national and international security.

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee &Tea Provided.

Following the announcement of a new US Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa in August 2022, and a second US-Africa Leaders Summit in December 2022, the goal of the Africa in Focus discussion series is to take stock of US-African relations to date, including unpacking key components of the US strategy, and understanding African perspectives on the current and future trajectory of US engagement on the continent.

Speaker: Jung Jae Kwon, Stanton Nuclear Security Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

How do non-nuclear allies of the U.S. try to generate deterrence without their own nuclear arsenal? How do the allies seek to employ their non-nuclear military capabilities even as they ultimately have to rely on the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" for security? While these questions have grown more important in an era of "integrated deterrence," existing scholarship on nuclear strategy or extended deterrence has largely overlooked the agency of allies. This project seeks to fill the gap. The speaker identifies three ways in which the allies have used their military capabilities to generate deterrent effects and develop a theory to explain and predict their behavior. He conducts case studies of U.S. allies, such as South Korea and Japan, to examine the causes of the variation in their behavior and draws on extensive fieldwork, elite interviews, and primary sources for empirical analysis.

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee &Tea Provided.

In 2022, an Iranian cyberattack took out critical public services across Albania. In an unprecedented response facilitated by rapid cooperation with the US Government and the private sector, the Albanian Prime Minister severed diplomatic ties with Iran, while working closely with Microsoft to restore services. In the seminar, you will hear from Microsoft's Cybersecurity expert Kozeta Garrett about the impact of these attacks on critical infrastructure and the work that went into restoring digital services, investigating adversary activity, and sharing information across the world. The Albania case study tells a broader story about how private firms and governments can cooperate, integrating technical investigations and changing approaches to geopolitical risks to address cyber threats of the future.

This seminar is co-sponsored by the Intelligence Project and Women in Defense, Diplomacy, and Development (W3D). It will take place on Wednesday, April 3rd from 1:30 to 2:45PM in the Fainsod Room and will be moderated by Intelligence Project Manager Maria Robson-Morrow. This seminar is in person only and is open to the first 40 registered Harvard ID holders. Light refreshments will be served and the seminar will be under the Chatham House Rules.

Speaker: Matthew Borawski, Research Fellow, International Security Program

The U.S. defense industrial base proved ill-equipped to adequately surge ammunition production for Ukraine's fight against Russia, with the Department of Defense reporting it will take nearly three years to replenish the two million 155mm artillery rounds provided to Ukraine. Meanwhile, the United States assumes increased conventional risk to its own warfighting capabilities. How did U.S. munitions manufacturing erode, was it avoidable, and what is needed to reach sufficient capacity in the future? The answer to these questions should inform the larger, more critical question: How can the United States ensure a munitions shortage does not occur if U.S. military forces are committed to large scale combat operations in the future? Answering the research question could help the United States maintain its conventional superiority in a future conflict and minimize readiness impacts when providing lethal assistance to our Allies and Partners, including Ukraine and Taiwan. These effects would also improve our integrated deterrence strategy since robust production capacity remains a deterrent. Instead, the United States appears to be in a continuous spin-up/ramp-down cycle for ammunition production, which creates the cyclical crisis and preparedness paradox.

Invitation Only. Coffee &Tea Provided.

Speaker: DJ Kim, Research Fellow, International Security Program

U.S. security clients have frequently encountered pressures from Washington to adopt strategic measures with which they did not agree. For these allies, although the reliance on U.S. security support creates a de facto security hierarchy and incentivizes them to take the U.S. request seriously, they often find the U.S. policy overreaching, poorly designed, or unsustainable. Accordingly, U.S. allies would want to avoid offering neither a positive nor negative answer to the patron, which, respectively, can undermine their own interests or the relationship with the patron. Put simply, U.S. allies have good reason to avoid making a decision over the patron's demand as long as possible, hoping that changes occur in the patron's position or the costs for making a decision become more bearable. This project attempts to theorize nondecision as a distinct option that might be pursued by a security client facing strategic demands from its patron. 

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee &Tea Provided.

Speaker: Sanne Verschuren, Assistant Professor of International Security, The Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University

Despite nearly seventy years of research and development in the United States, missile defense continues to face high, if not insurmountable, technological challenges, is financially burdensome, and has resulted in negative outcomes for strategic stability. Hence, the speaker asks: What explains the continued and widespread support for missile defense among U.S. policymakers? Contrary to arguments about American cultural features, public appeal, and organizational politics, she examines two conditions that can explain the persistence of missile defense: technological malleability and patterns of ignorance.

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee &Tea Provided.

Speaker: David Kearn, Research Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom

The book project seeks to explain the divergence of views of within the strategic community after the signing of the SALT I Accords and the subsequent shift in U.S. strategic nuclear policy away from "assured destruction" to "nuclear warfighting" throughout the 1970s and culminating in the Reagan administrations "prevailing strategy."

Open to Harvard ID Holders Only: Admittance will be on a first come–first served basis. Coffee &Tea Provided.

Over the past decade, various forms of representative, small group conversations—known collectively as sortition—have gained in global popularity. Those willing to participate are selected from among a larger sample of the population to meet offline or on for informed policy conversations. Now AI companies, too, are staging these civic dialogues in the hope of appearing more responsive to public input. 

In this AI Cyber Lunch, Beth Noveck, Professor of Experiential AI and Director of the Burnes Center for Social Change at Northeastern University, will discuss how AI could help us fashion better deliberation and more powerful forms of democratic engagement. Q&A to follow. Buffet-style lunch will be served.

Registration: No RSVP is required. Room capacity is limited and seating will be on a first come, first served basis. All are welcome to attend virtually via Zoom. Virtual attendees should register using the button below; upon registering, attendees will receive a confirmation email with a Zoom link.

Recording: Please be advised that this seminar will not be recorded. The event organizers prohibit any attendees, including journalists, from audio/visual recording or distributing parts or all of the event program without prior written authorization.

Accessibility: To request accommodations or for questions about access, please contact Liz Hanlon (ehanlon@hks.harvard.edu) in advance of the session.

Please join the Homeland Security Project for a lunch seminar on February 26 from 12-1:30pm with Mary Ellen Callahan, Assistant Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office. Assistant Secretary Callahan will discuss the work of the CWMD office in defending the United States against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats, as well as challenges and opportunities for DHS in the years ahead. The discussion will be moderated by Professor Juliette Kayyem, with time reserved for Q&A. 

This event is open to all Harvard students, fellows, faculty, and staff. Please RSVP below.