Keir A. Lieber
Experience
Keir A. Lieber is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. He is also a faculty fellow of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and the Nanovic Institute for European Studies. His current research focuses on the international politics of contemporary American grand strategy and U.S. nuclear weapons policy. He has held fellowships from the Brookings Institution, Earhart Foundation, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Andrew Mellon Foundation, and Smith Richardson Foundation.
Contact Info:
Phone: (574) 631-0379
Email: Keir.Lieber.1@nd.edu
Summer 2008
"Correspondence: Defensive Realism and the "New" History of World War I"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
By Jack Snyder and Keir A. Lieber
Jack Snyder replies to Keir Lieber's Fall 2007 International Security article, "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory."
Fall 2007
"The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 32
New historical evidence reveals that World War I, far from being accidental, was provoked by German leaders who hoped to dominate the European continent, fully aware that the conflict would be long and bloody. They did not have a blueprint for quick victory embodied in the Schlieffen Plan; they did not misjudge the nature of modern war; and they did not lose control of events and attack out of fear of their enemies moving first. This new historiography challenges the core concepts of defensive realism and calls for a reinterpretation of the war as it relates to causes of conflict.
Winter 2006/07
"Correspondence: The Short Shadow of U.S. Primacy?"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 31
By Jeffrey Lantis, Tom Sauer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, James Wirtz, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl Press
Jeffrey Lantis, Tom Sauer, and James Wirtz reply to Keir Lieber and Daryl Press's spring 2006 International Security article, "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy."
Spring 2006
"The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 30
By Keir A. Lieber and Daryl Press
Can the United States destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of China and Russia ? Keir Lieber and Daryl Press argue that not only does the United States have a potent first-strike capability, but that the nuclear balance will continue to shift in its favor, creating significant implications for international relations and U.S. foreign policy.
Winter 2005/06
"Correspondence: Striking the Balance"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 3, volume 30
By Robert Art, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1974-1977, 1978-1979, Stephen Brooks, Former Fellow, International Security Program, 2003-2004, William Wohlforth, Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander
Some scholars argue that the balance of power theory that explained the bipolar and multipolar systems of the past is irrelevant in a unipolar world. These letters debate the possibility of expanding the traditional definition of "balancing" to account for policies that states are pursuing today.
Summer 2005
"Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing Back"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 30
By Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander
There is little credible evidence that major powers are engaging in either hard or soft balancing against the United States. The absence of hard balancing is explained by the lack of underlying motivation to compete strategically with the United Statesunder current conditions. Soft balancing is much ado about nothing: the concept is difficult to define or operationalize; the behavior seems identical to traditional diplomatic friction; and, regardless, specific predictions of soft balancing are not supported by the evidence. Balancing against theUnited Statesis not occurring because contemporaryU.S.grand strategy, despite widespread criticism, poses a threat to only a very limited number of regimes and terrorist groups.
Summer 2000
"Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 25
The author critically assesses the offense-defense theory to determine how technology, in particular, has shaped the relative ease of offense and defense and the probability of war.
