


The Evolution of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine

Scott D. Sagan
May 7, 2008



Credible Minimum Deterrence and Nuclear Doctrine

“We have formally announced a policy of Non-First-Use ... We are also not going to enter into an arms race with any Country. Ours will be a minimum credible deterrent, which will safeguard India’s security, the security of one-sixth of humanity, now and into the future.” - Atal Vajpayee, December 1998



“We refuse to enter a nuclear arms race and instead seek stability in the region. Pakistan, unlike India, does not have any pretensions to regional or global power status. We are committed to a policy of responsibility and restraint by maintaining a credible minimum deterrent.” – Pervez Musharraf, May 2000



Four Theories in Search of a Doctrine

Theory	Key Influence/Logic	Prediction	Pakistan	India
<i>Realism</i>	Strategic environment	Conventional superiority = no first use (NFU) Conventional inferiority = first use (FU)	FU, Limited nuclear options (LNOs), Counterforce targeting (CF)	NFU, Invulnerable second strike forces, Counter value targeting CV
<i>Organization Theory</i>	Parochial interests and bias of military	Offensive, CF and FU, preventive war, decisive options, budget promotion and goal displacement	Military autonomy increases biases	Strict civilian control limits biases
<i>Individual Strategic Culture</i>	Historical experience/ cultural traditions	Unique to each country	Islam as force multiplier, martial race bias	Post-colonial distrust of military, Gandhian non-violence
<i>Global Strategic Culture</i>	Mimicry of most modern and prestigious actors	Isomorphism	Mimic US doctrine?	Mimic US doctrine?

Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine – 2001 Statement by Lt. General Khalid Kidwai¹



“It is well known that Pakistan does not have a ‘No First Use Policy.’ Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. In case that deterrence fails, they will be used if:”

- 1) India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold)
- 2) India destroys a large part either of its land or air forces (military threshold)
- 3) India proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan (economic threshold)
- 4) India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization threshold)

1. “Nuclear safety, nuclear stability, and nuclear strategy in Pakistan.” Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini. Landau Network – Centro Volta


Nuclear Weapons and Kargil - 1999



“The Prime Minister told Clinton that he wanted desperately to find a solution that would allow Pakistan to withdraw with some cover.. Clinton asked Sharif if he knew how advanced the threat of nuclear war really was? Did Sharif know his military was preparing their nuclear tipped missiles? Sharif seemed taken aback and said only that India was probably doing the same.”

(Bruce Riedel, "American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House," Centre for the Advance Study of India Policy Paper, University of Pennsylvania, 2002)

Indian and Pakistani missile alert plans - 1999



The Hindu Today **Nation**

My page | My e-mail | My messenger | My e-cards | My tose

Pakistan threatened India with nuclear attack during Kargil war: Army Chief

BY RAJ CHENGAPPA / INDIA TODAY
NEW DELHI, January 12, 05:01

General Sundarajan Padmanabhan said that during the Kargil conflict, Pakistan had activated one of its nuclear missile bases.

The buzz in the defence ministry corridors was well contained. The trusted defectors were tense, and nerves laid.


Buddha too had stopped smiling. He was distinctly frowning.

While the nation sat in front of television sets witnessing the Kargil conflict, Army top brass and the PMO were busy trying to crill some sense into Islamabad. Pakistan had threatened India with a nuclear attack.

In a startling revelation on Thursday, Army Chief of Staff General Sundarajan Padmanabhan said that during the Kargil War, Pakistan had activated one of its nuclear missile bases and was threatening India with a nuclear attack.

“It was a veiled threat... not so veiled at all.”

“However, in view of the intelligence reports about the Tilla Ranges being readied for possible launching of missiles and repeated statements being made by their political leaders and non-military senior officials, we considered it prudent to take some protective measures. Accordingly, some of our missile assets were dispersed and relocated.” – General V.P. Malik



However, declining to disclose exactly how India dealt with the threat, General Padmanabhan said, “Our government said what it had to say. There was a way of dealing with this kind of a threat.”

Given the lack of confidence between the two countries, General Padmanabhan said no one knew how far the “game” would have gone.

“Supposing we had decided to call the bluff and done exactly what we wanted. The intention was to limit the conflict in Kargil. Supposing we had decided to start a general war, if we had gone for an all out conventional war would they really have carried out a nuclear strike? How far it would have gone? I am afraid no one can answer this. The point is, to the end many knew they would have got back even worse than what they give. It is very difficult to say what could or might have happened.”

“Presently, I think that it is insane to fight a nuclear war. At best, nuclear weapon is a tool for deterrence and at worst, a tool for escalation. You can bait the fellow’s arms up to a point. But if he decides to call the bluff... well the other fellow will probably back out.”

On the lessons drawn from Kargil war, General Padmanabhan said, “The first lesson is – don’t be surprised. You need adequate surveillance and intelligence of the areas you operate in. And the most important lesson, in my opinion, is not to rely on the enemy’s goodwill or his military judgment for your security.”

More of this story in the case of the Hill, but without a follow-up that comes from the military and...

Tilla Ranges, near Jhelum Punjab

The Vulnerability/Invulnerability Paradox

The Washington Post

Sunday, November 11, 2001; Page A01

Pakistan Moves Nuclear Weapons

-- Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf ordered an emergency redeployment of the country's nuclear arsenal to at least six secret new locations and has recognized military oversight of the nuclear forces in the weeks since Pakistan joined the U.S. campaign against terrorism, according to senior officials here.

[In 1999] military officers here secretly contacted Taliban officials about the possibility of moving some nuclear assets west to neighboring Afghanistan for safekeeping, according to a recently retired Pakistani general familiar with the talks.

'The option was actively discussed with the Taliban after some indications emerged that India may open hostilities at the eastern border,' the official said. 'The Taliban accepted the requests with open arms.'"

Pakistan and the A.Q. Khan Network

- Illicit export activities
 - Iraq (offered centrifuge bomb designs)
 - Libya (centrifuges and design)
 - DPRK (centrifuges and design)
 - Iran (centrifuges and design)
- Negligence or complicity?
- Musharraf's memoirs

KRL Products OF Vacuum Technology

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
A. Q. KHAN RESEARCH LABORATORIES

Dr. A. Q. Khan
(NI & Bar, HI)

State of Vacuum Science and Technology
A. Q. Khan Research Laboratories
P. O. Box 502, Rawalpindi, Pakistan

Strategic Culture or Military Morale?

“Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent’s heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge.

“Above all, we must realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our adversaries in today's

world do not have. It is a weapon that we as Americans do have.”
Ronald Reagan, January 1981
“There is no one who comes to our aid in this very threat (an Indian attack) was surmounted owing to someone’s help or participation. I want to tell you all today that for facing threat no one comes to anyone’s help. It is because of our own strength, morale, faith, determination that we surmounted this threat.” - Pervez Musharraf, December 31, 2002.



Goal Displacement and Nuclear Doctrine –



“Our critical concerns, our important concerns can come under threat. When I say critical concerns, I mean our strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir. If these come under threat it would be a worse situation for us... If you watch [Indian] television, you will find them dishing out propaganda against Pakistan, day in and day out. I would like to tell India “Lay Off.” Pakistan’s armed forces and every Pakistani citizen is ready to offer any sacrifice in order to defend Pakistan and secure its strategic assets.” – Pervez Musharraf, September 19, 2001.

“We have two national vital interests, our nuclear program – being a nuclear state and the Kashmir cause is national vital interest. We will put our lives at stake for these strategic assets. There is no pressure whatsoever on me to roll back the nuclear and missile programme, we are not rolling back, there is no question, these are our national interests and only a backlash of those who deceive the country and the nation just for nothing.” -Pervez Musharraf, February 5, 2004



Indian Nuclear Doctrine: 2001-2002 Crisis

“If we have to go to war, jolly good...If we don't, we will still manage. [Pakistani leaders had] “stated that they will use nuclear weapons first should the necessity arise.” [In an apparent reference to Musharraf,] “if he is man enough, correction mad enough...he can use it.” If anyone uses nuclear weapons against India...the perpetrators of that particular outrage shall be punished so severely that their continuation thereafter in fray will be in doubt...Yes, we are ready. Take it from me, we have enough.” – S. Padmabhan, January 2002.



“The Government had not been talking of nuclear weapons. I wish everyone would give up this talk of nuclear weapons being brought into play. The use of nuclear weapons is far too serious a matter that it should be bandied about in a cavalier manner.” – George Fernandes, January 2002.

Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine: 2001-2002 Crisis



“For us, the use of nuclear weapons is an utterly last resort. We conduct ourselves responsibly... We would consider the nuclear option only if "all Pakistan were in danger of disappearing from the map." In that case: nuclear weapons too.” – Pervez Musharraf, April 2002.

“Any incursion by the Indian forces across the LoC even by an inch will unleash a storm that will sweep the enemy... Victory comes through offensive strategy and our forces are ready for it if war is thrust on Pakistan by India... Military history is full of examples where numerically inferior forces defeated the larger numbers... Seeing the glimmer in the eyes of all pilots and airmen I met, I am fully confident that Insha’Allah (God willing), the PAF will give a befitting response to any adventurism by India and create yet another chapter full of glory and valour in the history.” – Pervez Musharraf, May 29, 2002.

Indian Nuclear Doctrine – January 2003 Statement¹

- (i) Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;
- (ii) A posture of “No First Use”: nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;
- (iii) Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
- (iv) Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.
- (v) Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;
- (vi) However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons

1. “The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews operationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine.” *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India*. January 4, 2003. <http://meaindia.nic.in/pressrelease/2003/01/04pr01.htm>

Conclusions



1. “Credible Minimum Deterrence” is highly elastic.
2. Pakistani FU doctrine and procurement goals reflects parochial interests of military and goal displacement.
3. Indian nuclear doctrine - strongly influenced by US Doctrine – is moving away from strict NFU
4. Resulting nuclear operations are dangerous
5. Significant room for arms racing, crisis instability, and inadvertent escalation in the future.