Middle East Initiative

“If only we had a partner for peace.”

That’s been the refrain in the Israel-Palestinian conflict for as long as I’ve followed it. But the truth is you don’t need just a partner; you need two partners able to deliver at the same time.

Please listen here for an interview with MEI Senior Fellow, Dr. Salam Fayyad, on 'The Ezra Klein Show' podcast with the New York Times.

Over the past few months, much has been said about the relationship between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, some of it strikingly shallow and misinformed, with recent op-eds characterising it as a “rivalry” or a “rift”, and one going as far as calling it a “theatre of confrontation” as though their relations are a zero-sum game. Such alarmism led me to wonder if we were even discussing the same two countries.

After six years of U.S. “maximum pressure,” Iran’s economy continues to defy dire predictions of economic collapse that motivated Trump’s hasty 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (also known as the JCPOA). The Biden administration’s continuation of the same policy since 2021 is similarly based on the logic that the weaker Iran’s economy is, the more likely Tehran will bend to Washington’s will. The economy’s resilience is evidenced by the fact that in the first nine months of the Iranian fiscal year (March 21 to December 20, 2023), GDP grew by a 6.7% annual rate, and it is very likely to finish the year in two months with a growth rate exceeding the World Bank and IMF forecasts of about 4%.

Join Middle East Initiative Faculty Chair and Ford Foundation Professor of Democracy and Governance, Tarek Masoud, in a series of frank, open, and probing encounters with vital and varied perspectives on the current conflict, its causes, and the prospects for peace and progress in the region.

Mohammad Tabaar argues that the attacks on Red Sea ships unintentionally advance the Houthis agenda by allowing it to claim that it is fighting imperialism, and the attacks help Iran by fortifying its political foothold in the Middle East. Washington should therefore cease the strikes. It should, instead, work to halt the war in Gaza. The United States should also try to strengthen the region's diplomatic agreements and shore up its security framework. Otherwise, the Houthi-Iranian partnership will only grow stronger, as will Tehran's leverage in the region.

It should be evident that a major reassessment of United States policy is required in the wake of Hamas’ brutal  attacks on Israelis on October 7, 2023, followed by Israel’s massive retaliation causing a major humanitarian disaster in Gaza and risking expansion of the conflict with regional consequences. There can be no going back to the status quo ante. The time has come for sober and objective reflection in Washington of what went wrong, lessons learned and how to proceed to craft a strategic approach toward the Middle East that reflects the realities on the ground while shedding past mindsets and policies that have simply failed.

As of early January 2024, discussion of the Gaza war heavily focuses on its humanitarian costs, cease fire possibilities, hostage prospects, and “day after” options. Yet what longer-term strategy guides actions on these vital issues while offering a more positive vision for Israelis, Palestinians, and key regional players? This paper sketches such a vision and strategy, but far more importantly, highlights the formidable barriers to its realization—and the elements of a realistic path to overcoming those barriers. With old political assumptions jolted by recent events, an opening exists for a new and better regional reality to take shape.

In an interview with Nada Ramadan Ahmed, North Africa Analyst with MEES magazine, she quotes Marina Lorenzini on the topic of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in Egypt: "Putin has used the Russian nuclear energy industry, through Rosatom, as a strategic export to build deep dependencies with geopolitically significant countries, such as Bangladesh, Egypt, and Turkey. So, even as times get tough in Moscow, Rosatom's foreign projects may not receive an immediate axe."

Other companies cannot necessarily replace Rosatom if needed, leaving Cairo "in a bind to negotiate with Moscow on a point-by-point basis on how to purchase and integrate new equipment. Moscow will likely not welcome such a move, and Cairo may not have a strong enough bargaining position, especially if it's not paying its bills on time, in order to introduce non-Russian supplies on site."

The story we often hear of how the Tunisian Revolution succeeded goes as follows: After weeks of protests, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ordered the head of the army, Gen. Rachid Ammar, to fire on the protesters. Ammar, however, refused, and without the military to defend him Ben Ali fled the country. Ammar was therefore lionized as a hero of the revolution, with the press calling him “the man who said no." But in reality, none of this actually happened. Ammar himself, in his official testimony in April 2011, called it “a false rumor,” explaining that he was never asked to fire on protesters and thus never refused.

With 22 countries pledging to triple global nuclear energy production by 2050 at the COP28 climate meeting in Dubai, sincere prospects for growth in global nuclear energy market is on the table. Nonetheless, these 22 countries largely represent ones that have minimal ties with Russia’s nuclear exports or are seeking to decouple themselves from a current dependency. 

Many other countries are considering the option of nuclear energy, and several will turn to Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy company, Rosatom, to build their new reactors. Since assuming power, Russian President Vladimir Putin has developed Russia’s nuclear industry exports as a key piece of its energy and geopolitical portfolio. 

One country in particular has embraced a partnership with Rosatom: Egypt. In 2015, Russia and Egypt concluded an intergovernmental agreement that led Rosatom to build a $30-billion nuclear power plant near the Mediterranean coastal town of El Dabaa, about 170 kilometers west of Alexandria. With four Russian-designed, 1.2-gigawatt, VVER reactor units, the El Dabaa nuclear power plant is expected to generate more than 10 percent of total electricity production in Egypt and provide a consistent baseload power source for 20 million people.