"At no point in the history of U.S. nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy have financial sanctions been so central to U.S. efforts to prevent or rollback the acquisition of nuclear weapons in countries such as North Korea and Iran. Despite this crucial role, financial sanctions have been examined almost solely from the sender’s perspective, that is, the country imposing the sanctions. Few focused policy analyses have measured the effects of these instruments from the target’s perspective..."

With origins dating back to the late 1960s, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has evolved to be a multipurpose instrument of the regime’s security strategy.This book chapter presents a new framework of analysis to explore North Korea’s evolving use of its nuclear arsenal and implications for both the Korean Peninsula and U.S. policy.

John S. Park, Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Project on Managing the Atom Associate, argues that cooperation between North Korea and Iran has been a critical—yet underexamined—enabler of North Korea's recent success. He concludes that the time has come for the United States to view the two previously independent missile programs as two sides of the same coin and recommends strategies for disrupting the procurement channels between Iran and North Korea.

This chapter examines the relationship between security assurances and North Korean nuclear decision-making by focusing on four key areas: key geopolitical shocks that had a major impact on the North Korean regime; main sources of security assurances for North Korea over its history; this volume's hypotheses on security assurances based on how North Korea reacted to geopolitical shocks; and conditions under which security assurances may be most effective in dealing with North Korea in the future.

"Amid setbacks and chronic challenges in almost every major region, Washington views South Korea as a linchpin on a global scale. From hosting the G20 summit in 2010 to preparing to host the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, South Korea has been establishing itself as a global partner in addressing common challenges, ranging from rebalancing the international economy to preventing the use of nuclear materials for terrorist attacks. For President Lee, the state visit is an important opportunity to demonstrate South Korea’s unique role as a bridge between the developed and developing countries."

On September 28, North Korean state media announced that Kim Jong-il's third son, Kim Jong-eun, was promoted to the rank of four-star general just prior to the opening of the Workers' Party of Korea conference. Kim Jong-eun was later named vice chairman of the Party's Central Military Commission at the conference. These important developments follow the late August meeting between Chinese President Hu Jintao and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in Changchun, near the Sino-DPRK border, which appears to have cleared the way for this Party conference. After the meeting, both countries' state media reported the leaders' support for the rising generation of the Party — a clear reference to Kim Jong-eun.

"...if China continues to prioritise friendly commercial relations with North Korea and Iran, it will threaten its own long-term security. A chronically proliferating North Korea would provoke Japan to reassess the need for a nuclear deterrent, while a nuclear-armed Iran could destabilise the Gulf and global energy markets. Crafting an approach that includes a sustained US-China engagement to clarify each side's intent, provides for China's energy security and maintains a focus on the threat of nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran is more likely to achieve our shared non-proliferation goals."

Despite extensive diplomatic efforts to facilitate the six-party talks, domestic policy constraints, differing priorities, and conflicting historical analogies among each of the countries have brought vastly differing perspectives to the multilateral negotiating table.