What shapes public support for military missions? Existing scholarship points to, on the one hand, individuals' affiliations and predispositions (such as political partisanship and gender), and, on the other hand, factors that shape a rational cost–benefit analysis (notably, mission objectives, the prospects for victory, and the magnitude and distribution of costs). The authors argue that public opinion is also shaped by beliefs about why soldiers voluntarily enlist. This article has implications for debates on the determinants of public support for military missions and the relationship between military service and citizenship in democracies.

An influential model of democratic civil-military relations insists that civilian politicians and officials, accountable to the public, have "the right to be wrong" about the use of force: they, not senior military officers, decide when force will be used and set military strategy. While polls have routinely asked about Americans' trust in the military, they have rarely probed deeply into Americans' views of civil-military relations. 

Dr. Aaron Rapport, a 2009–2010 International Security Program (ISP) research fellow, died peacefully in hospice on June 27, 2019 in Cambridge, United Kingdom. He had battled cancer for four years.

The George W. Bush administration’s assessments of challenges that might come after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq were wide of the mark, but it is unclear why this was the case. An established psychological theory that describes how peoplementally represent distant future actions—as opposed to those that are seen as impending—explains the nature of strategic assessment in the Iraq case. As individuals think about actions at the end of a sequence of events, the desirability of their goals becomes increasingly salient relative to the feasibility of achieving them. This makes decisionmakers more prone to underestimate the costs and risks of future actions.