Colossal, but Wise?

Israel was blessed with an extraordinary Air Force, even before the recent arrival of the F35, known in the IDF as the "Colossus" (Adir). Israel has already decided to procure 50 F35s, in three deals worth $7.2 billion, and if it purchases 25 more, as planned, the total cost will reach an almost unimaginable $10 billion.

The question is not whether the IDF needs the F35, it does. The problem is that not only the aircraft is "colossal," but the cost, as well, and even though it will be funded through the U.S. military assistance program, it comes at the expense of other procurement programs and will tie down a large part of Israel's total defense resources, and of the nation as a whole, for many years. The Air Force is Israel's strategic arm and must be equipped with weapons systems at the very forefront of technology. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon us that we question how many aircraft truly are needed, when, and what the possible alternative uses of the budgetary resources are.

First of all, the nature of the military threats Israel faces has changed fundamentally and, at least for the mid-long term, there is no longer a need to achieve air superiority against enemy air forces and possibly to procure so many aircraft. There are, admittedly, extreme scenarios that might justify the need for this, but their probability is low and defense policy is a matter of risk management. The Air Force's true missions today are a potential attack in Iran, which may still prove necessary, and dealing with the threats posed by Hezbollah and Hamas.

Second, the IDF itself believes that the Iranian nuclear threat has been postponed, at the very least, by a few years. Israel must maintain an optimal capability to conduct a strike in Iran, at all times, but it has already devoted huge sums to this end. Moreover, the reason it has not struck, to date, was apparently not the absence of the F35, but U.S. opposition and the belief that a strike would be able to achieve no more than a few years delay, in any event, and at a heavy price. It is thus possible that the third deal for the F35, which has yet to be completely finalized, and the planned fourth one, could be postponed and that the available budgets could be invested in more pressing needs.

Third, the Trump administration is likely to adopt a more hawkish position towards the Iranian nuclear issue and the possibility of a U.S. military strike is now greater, especially if Iran violates the nuclear agreement. Israel thus has an opportunity to reach strategic understandings with the United States which may make procurement of at least some of the aircraft unnecessary, or deferable. A U.S. strike is far preferable, from every per point of view, than an Israeli one.

Fourth, Israel has already developed a massive capability to hit Hezbollah from the air and the F35 cannot change the two fundamental dilemmas that it faces: the fact that Hezbollah, as a sub-state actor, does not have "centers of gravity," i.e. military targets whose destruction would change the course of the battle, and that its enormous rocket arsenal cannot be destroyed solely from the air and would require a major ground operation whose costs exceed the benefits. Moreover, even if we chose to bite the bullet and pay the price, occupy all of Lebanon and root out the rockets, Iran will be able to replenish them in a relatively short period of time.

Finally, Israel has not succeeded in defeating Hezbollah and Hamas, through offensive means, in any of the operations to date and this dismal reality is unlikely to change in the future, primarily because the magnitude of the threat does not justify the cost and due to the unique difficulties involved in confrontations with sub-state actors. Conversely, defensive measures, in the form of the "Iron Dome" anti-rocket system, succeeded in neutralizing the threat at the Hamas level and, in the absence of an effective offensive capability, Israel should seek to neutralize the threat at the far greater Hezbollah level by deploying a full national rocket shield. This does not mean a hermetic shield that not a single rocket will get through, but that there will no longer be a need to prioritize defense of vital military and infrastructure sites (such as airbases and power stations) over civilian population centers, and that the civilian home front will be able to continue functioning without severe disruptions.

The new ten-year U.S. military assistance package includes $5 billion for rocket defense, a very generous sum, but is far less than needed and, in any event, Israel cannot afford to wait for a decade. To the contrary, it should set a two–three year time line for deploying a national rocket shield and to this end either change its procurement priorities or mobilize the necessary resources from the public in the form of an emergency "Iron Dome Tax." Israel simply cannot tolerate the magnitude of destruction likely in the next round with Hezbollah.

The investment in the "Colossus" may be entirely warranted, but the IDF has yet to provide the public with satisfactory answers to the broader national security considerations raised above. Far more worrisomely, the cabinet was also not presented with the full range of needs and options. The Air Force wants the Colossus, understandably from its perspective, but it does not see the overall national picture and is not responsible for it. It is precisely for this reason that deep cabinet involvement, based on an effective national security council, is essential. Procurement of the F35 should not just be "colossal," but wise, so we have some money left over for other vital needs, as well.

Statements and views expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author and do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, the Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.