- Arms Control Association
- Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program
- Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
- Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland
- Center for International Security and Cooperation – Stanford University
- Euratom
- Fissile Materials Working Group
- Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
- Global Security Newsire
- Global Threat Reduction Initiative
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
- IAEA Office of Nuclear Security
- Institute for Nuclear Materials Management
- International Panel on Fissile Materials
- International Regulators Conference on Nuclear Security
- James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
- Monterey WMD Terrorism Database
- National Nuclear Security Administration (U.S.)
- Nuclear Industry Summit 2014
- Nuclear Material Security - The Stanley Foundation
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.)
- Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group
- Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
- NTI 2014 Nuclear Security Summit Resources
- Partnership for Global Security
- Project on Managing the Atom
- Proliferation Security Initiative
- Rosatom
- Verification Research, Training and Information Centre
- World Institute for Nuclear Security
The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”