Video of Ernest May discussing the frame of mind in which policymakers approached Vietnam.

A video of Ernest May discussing the lessons of Vietnam in the context of Robert McNamara's book.

Video of Ernest May discussing the lessons for todays policymakers from the Cuban Missile Crisis.

This late 1950's Harvard promotional film, "To the Age that is Waiting," features young assistant professor Ernest May.

"Despite all our accumulated information about 1914, we are still very far from being clear as to what men in power understood to be happening, why they thought it mattered, or how they assessed their action choices."

The 9/11 Commission was "set up to fail." So says its chairman, former Republican Governor of New Jersey Thomas Kean. "If you want something to fail," he explains, "you take a controversial topic and appoint five people from each party. You make sure they are appointed by the most partisan people from each party--the leaders of the party. And, just to be sure, let's ask the commission to finish the report during the most partisan period of time--the presidential election season." He could have added that President Bush and Republican leaders in Congress had agreed to create the commission only under unrelenting pressure from the families of the victims, and also that Congress had given it a meager budget and a requirement to get all its work done in a scant eighteen months. He could have added, too, that he was the president's second choice as chairman, Henry Kissinger having stepped down after sixteen days because of the demand by the families that he disclose the names of clients of his consulting firm, and that Kean started under the handicap of never having worked in Washington. It was to be mid-March 2003 before he even had the security clearances needed to read pre-September 11 intelligence reports.

The United States continues to proclaim its support for democracy and its opposition to tyranny, but American presidents often have supported dictators who have allied themselves with the United States. This book illustrates the chronic dilemmas inherent in U.S. dealings with dictators under conditions of uncertainty and moral ambiguity.

Ernest May and Philip Zelikow dispute several points made by Richard Falkenrath in his review of The 9/11 Commission Report. Falkenrath replies to their criticisms.

"...these cases were designed for and used in executive program classes for senior managers in the U.S. intelligence community...."