In the modern era, there is great convergence in the technologies used by friendly nations and by hostile ones. Signals intelligence agencies find themselves penetrating the technologies that they also at times must protect. To ease this tension, the United States and its partners have relied on an approach sometimes called Nobody But Us, or NOBUS: target communications mechanisms using unique methods accessible only to the United States. This paper examines how the NOBUS approach works, its limits, and the challenging matter of what comes next.
Mahsa Rouhi is a postdoctoral fellow at International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom. She is also a research associate at MIT, Center for International Studies, where she has worked on various research projects since 2009.
She received her Ph.D. from King's College, University of Cambridge, UK. She received her B.A. in Economics from Shahid Beheshty University in Tehran, Iran, and her Master's Degree in Political Theory from University of Sheffield, UK.
She was a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at University of Miami from 2014–2016 where she taught courses on security and diplomacy in IR, conflict resolution, Islam and politics, and foreign policy with special focus on the Middle East region. She was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow and an associate with the International Security Program and the Project on Managing the Atom previously at the Belfer Center, 2010–2013. Her research primarily focuses on nuclear security and security policy in the Middle East region, Iran in particular. Her other research interests include energy security, Islam and politics, and civil-military relations.
She has published op-eds in Al-Monitor, National Interest, the Christian Science Monitor and serves as a consultant to national and international organizations. She conducts policy-relevant research as well as academic research.Last Updated: May 25, 2017, 3:14pm