"Iran's leaders, like those in other states, want to remain in power.  They want the regime in which they have invested and which serves their interests to endure.  Foreign policy, in addition to safeguarding Iran's borders and national integrity, is a means for safeguarding the regime.  Possession of a nuclear weapon will likely make Iran more impervious to attack and may make Iran bolder in its support for armed groups.  However, possessing a nuclear weapon will is not likely to alter Iran's paramount foreign policy goals of national and regime security."

"...nuclear terrorism is a global issue, extending far beyond the familiar policy talking points of U.S. cooperation with Russia over its nuclear stockpiles, the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the face of threats from Islamic extremists, and concerns that if Iran acquires nuclear capabilities it could provide a bomb to sympathetic terrorist organizations....the essential ingredients required for making a nuclear weapon exist in more than 40 countries, in facilities with differing levels of security. Unfortunately, there are still no binding global standards on how to secure nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear material."

WITH THE release of the Iraq Study Group's report and pending completion of two inter governmental reviews, a US policy change in Iraq is inevitable. The key to this policy change, in order to salvage the reputation and relevance of the United States, should be a new strategic shift based upon the principles on which America was founded -- a doctrine of non occupation.

How long until Iran becomes a nuclear weapons state?
The current best guess of American intelligence agencies is found in a classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) completed last summer: "Left to its own devices, Iran is determined to build nuclear weapons," it says, yet it is unlikely that Iran could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a bomb before "early to mid-next decade."

Anticipate the worst by shoring up reserves for insurance losses.

ANTI-WAR LIBERALS, George H. W. Bush Republicans and even some neoconservative hawks have begun to coalesce around the same accurate position: America's continued troop presence in Iraq has only fed the insurgency. So with the elections over, it's time to bring the soldiers home.

Op-ed about Pakistan-based nuclear poliferation network

“Why did the world stand by and do nothing while the genocide in Rwanda unfolded?” This question has been repeatedly asked by journalists, policy-makers and scholars since the systematic massacre of 500,000–800,000 Tutsis and Hutu moderates by their Hutu countrymen in 1994.

The third Western attempt at regime construction in Iraq is now underway. Western plans to rebuild the Iraqi state will fail again if they ignore the real roots of Iraqi insecurity: its geopolitical weakness. The preoccupation with designing a new constitution ignores the historical evidence of the 1930s and 1950s that it is bound to fail. Surrounded by far larger powers such as Turkey and Iran, Iraq desperately needs long-term commitments of arms and allies. While de-garrisoning is a vital part of the regional peace puzzle, an insecure Iraq destabilises politics in Baghdad and fuels arms competitions.

Nuclear terrorism is not a post-9/11 or even post-cold war phenomenon. In fact, this review of declassified intelligence estimates spanning the past five decades reveals that the prospect of a clandestine nuclear attack on the United States—be it from the Soviet Union, China, or al Qaeda—has been a regular concern for U.S. officials since the advent of nuclear weapons. Although the estimates themselves have been a mixed bag of quiet successes and failures, this article’s key findings suggest that the threat of nuclear terrorism is very real and that the U.S. government remains ill prepared to counter that threat.