A sampling of recent books from Belfer Center affiliates.

Coercion moves beyond these somewhat hidebound premises and examines the critical issue of coercion in the 21st century, with a particular focus on new actors, strategies and objectives in this very old bargaining game. The chapters in this volume examine intra-state, inter-state, and transnational coercion and deterrence as well as both military and non-military instruments of persuasion, thus expanding our understanding of coercion for conflict in the 21st century.

Former ISP (International Security Program) Research Fellow Peter Krause has published a book with Cornell University Press (2017), Rebel Power: Why National Movements Compete, Fight, and Win, as part of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs series.

A sampling of recent books from Belfer Center affiliates.

"...[A]lthough the leaderships of Israel and the Palestinians did not order these killings, it also true that these attacks are symptoms of a broader phenomenon: Radical flank groups that are willing to take risks to capture territory or coerce the enemy to the (potential) benefit of their movements, but whose extreme rhetoric and actions can also blacken their reputation and chain-gang them into undesirable conflicts."

When and why do national movements succeed? What explains variation in the use and effectiveness of political violence employed by nationalist groups? Analysis of seventeen campaigns involving sixteen groups within the Palestinian and Algerian national movements suggests that hegemonic movements with one significant group are most likely to succeed.

Peter Krause describes how the internal structure of violent and nonviolent national movements is the key to understanding their success--or failure.

Peter Krause describes how the internal structure of violent and nonviolent national movements is the key to understanding their success--or failure.

"The internal unity of social movements has often served as the deciding factor between movements that have succeeded and failed to secure independence. In the cases of Algeria, Vietnam, and even the Zionists in the Palestinian Mandate, competing factions were able to come together to present a united front to their adversary at key moments."

The United States cannot defeat al-Qaeda by strength of arms alone.  It must also change the terms of debate in the Arab/Muslim world, especially in its radical wing.  How can this best be accomplished?  What strategy should the United States adopt for what is often called the “war of ideas” against radical Islam?