In the modern era, there is great convergence in the technologies used by friendly nations and by hostile ones. Signals intelligence agencies find themselves penetrating the technologies that they also at times must protect. To ease this tension, the United States and its partners have relied on an approach sometimes called Nobody But Us, or NOBUS: target communications mechanisms using unique methods accessible only to the United States. This paper examines how the NOBUS approach works, its limits, and the challenging matter of what comes next.
Scott J. Shackelford is an Associate Professor at the Indiana University Kelley School of Business where he teaches cybersecurity law and policy, sustainability, and international business law. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, a Visiting Scholar at Stanford Law School, and a Term Member at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Professor Shackelford has written more than 100 books, articles, and essays for diverse outlets. He is also the author of Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business, and Relations: In Search of Cyber Peace (Cambridge University Press, 2014). Both Professor Shackelford's academic work and teaching have been recognized with numerous awards, including a Hoover Institution National Fellowship, a Notre Dame Institute for Advanced Study Distinguished Fellowship, the 2014 Indiana University Outstanding Junior Faculty Award, and the 2015 Elinor Ostrom Award.
During his Cyber Security Project fellowship, Professor Shackelford focused on the law and governance of cyber peace.Last Updated: Mar 2, 2017, 11:21am