13 Items

Paper

US-Russian Contention in Cyberspace

| June 2021

The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”

A Tajik conscript looks out over remote stretches of northern Afghanistan from a border outpost near Khorog, Tajikistan.

Photo by David Trilling (c)

Report - Russia Matters

Jihadists from Ex-Soviet Central Asia: Where Are They? Why Did They Radicalize? What Next?

| Fall 2018

Thousands of radicals from formerly Soviet Central Asia have traveled to fight alongside IS in Syria and Iraq; hundreds more are in Afghanistan. Not counting the fighting in those three war-torn countries, nationals of Central Asia have been responsible for nearly 100 deaths in terrorist attacks outside their home region in the past five years. But many important aspects of the phenomenon need more in-depth study.

This research paper attempts to answer four basic sets of questions: (1) Is Central Asia becoming a new source of violent extremism that transcends borders, and possibly continents? (2) If so, why? What causes nationals of Central Asia to take up arms and participate in political violence? (3) As IS has been all but defeated in Iraq and Syria, what will Central Asian extremists who have thrown in their lot with the terrorist group do next? And (4) do jihadists from Central Asia aspire to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction? If so, how significant a threat do they pose and who would be its likeliest targets?

    Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

    Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism

    | October 2, 2013

    The 2011 “U.S. - Russia Joint Threat Assessment” offered both specific conclusions about the nature of the threat and general observations about how it might be addressed. This report builds on that foundation and analyzes the existing framework for action, cites gaps and deficiencies, and makes specific recommendations for improvement.

    Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

    Transcending Mutual Deterrence in the U.S.-Russian Relationship

    | September 30, 2013

    Even as this paper was being written and edited, U.S.-Russian relations have warmed and chilled. Today, as we are about to go to press, marks a particularly chilly period in recent history, with the cancellation of a planned Moscow Summit in September 2013. To some, this cold spell might signal an inapt moment to consider issues related to transcending mutual deterrence. Such a view would overlook the aims of the paper, which attempts to assess the central and enduring interests of the United States and Russia, the extent to which they coincide or conflict, and whether or not in light of these interests mutual deterrence should remain a fundamental feature of the relationship.

    Report

    The U.S.-Russia Joint Threat Assessment of Nuclear Terrorism

    | June 6, 2011

    Researchers from the United States and Russia have issued a joint assessment of the global threat of nuclear terrorism, warning of a persistent danger that terrorists could obtain or make a nuclear device and use it with catastrophic consequences. The first joint threat assessment by experts from the world’s two major nuclear powers concludes: “If current approaches toward eliminating the threat are not replaced with a sense of urgency and resolve, the question will become not if but when, and on what scale, the first act of nuclear terrorism occurs.”

    Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

    Breaking the Stalemate of Collective Insecurity in Europe

    | June 2011

    When it comes to the divisive issues that hinder the cooperation of Russia and the NATO countries, there are two that stand out: the building of European missile defenses and the reforming of the collective security mechanism on the continent. If resolved, these issues could become game-changers in Russia’s relations with the United States and its NATO allies.

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    Paper

    Alternative futures for Russia: the presidential elections and beyond

    | June 02, 2011

    This paper by  Simon Saradzhyan and Nabi Abdullaev outlines scenarios for Russia’s short-term future with a focus on potential outcomes of the March 2012 presidential elections.

    The authors note that terrorism and insurgency continue to threaten Russia’s national security and that previous attacks demonstrate the potential capability of groups to attack high-security facilities, including nuclear facilities. They warn that terrorist networks may manage to acquire and use WMD in a major Russian city or in a series of coordinated attacks, including seizures of towns and hostage-takings, and trigger a massive, indiscriminate government response.

    Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

    Russia's Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Their Current Configuration and Posture: A Strategic Asset or Liability?

    | January 2010

    In the eyes of Russian leaders, non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) play a critical role in the nation's defense and security posture as part of the country's overall nuclear arsenal and as an equalizer for the weakness of the nation's conventional forces vis-a-vis NATO and China. Russia's military-political leadership and policy influentials also assign a number of specific roles to NSNWs, including deterrence of powers in the south. Given these perceived and real benefits of possessing NSNWs, it is rather difficult to imagine that Russia will agree to eliminate all of its non-strategic nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future even if its actions are fully reciprocated by the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states.