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"Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Dangerous Than Many Think"
An analysis of the al-Qaida network suggests that as al-Qaida adopts a more networked organization, it becomes exposed to a gamut of organizational dilemmas that threatens to reduce its unity, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.
FEATURED PUBLICATIONS
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Fall 2008
"Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why al-Qaida May Be Less Dangerous Than Many Think"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
By Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones
Closer attention to a wider body of historical and contemporary research on dynamics of participation in underground movements, the life cycle of terrorism and insurgency, and vulnerabilities in organized crime reveals that clandestine networks are often not as adaptable or resilient as they are made out to be. An analysis of the al-Qaida network suggests that as al-Qaida adopts a more networked organization, it becomes exposed to a gamut of organizational dilemmas that threatens to reduce its unity, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.
Fall 2008
"Nuclear Stability in South Asia"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
An examination of the onset, evolution, and termination of the 1999 and 2001–02 crises between India and Pakistan suggests that nuclear deterrence is robust in South Asia. Even though the 1999 crisis erupted into a war, its scope and dimensions were carefully circumscribed. Despite its conventional capabilities, India chose not to cross the Line of Control (the de facto international border in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir), and it avoided horizontal escalation of the conflict.
Fall 2008
"Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
Nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment. First, nuclear weapons’ ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan’s dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. Second, these Indo-Pakistani crises led India to adopt a more aggressive conventional military posture toward Pakistan. This development could exacerbate regional security-dilemma dynamics and increase the likelihood of Indo-Pakistani conflict in years to come. Thus nuclear weapons not only destabilized South Asia in the first decade after the nuclear tests; they may damage the regional security environment well into the future.
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Fall 2008
"Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the Forced Migration Crisis"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
By Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2002-2003
Since the 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque, 4.5 million Iraqis have fled their homes, and displacement has become a central strategy in the civil war. To prevent the wide-scale militarization of the displaced Iraqis, donors and host states should heed the following policy recommendations. First, provide a massive infusion of humanitarian aid. Second, resist the temptation to build camps to house the displaced. Third, do not return the displaced people home against their will. Fourth, expand and expedite the resettlement process, especially for vulnerable Iraqis such as those who were once coalition employees.
Fall 2008
"Making the World Safe for Partial Democracy? Questioning the Premises of Democracy Promotion"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
By Arthur Goldsmith, Former Senior Research Fellow, Intrastate Conflict Program/International Security Program, 2004-2005
Democracy promotion is a favored strategy to advance the cause of world peace, especially in the Greater Middle East, but undifferentiated democracy promotion has two faulty premises. First, all progress toward the establishment of democratic regimes does not necessarily make the global community safer. Second, regime change is not something external actors have the capacity to direct along desired pathways. The first assumption fails to consider the well-documented security problems caused by partial democracies. The second assumption overstates the ability of powerful outsiders to induce transitions to full democracy. These research findings are grounds for cautious and selective democracy promotion, not a blanket approach that is indifferent to the composition of the regimes designated to be reformed and democratized.
Fall 2008
"Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
By Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy
British appeasement was primarily a strategy of buying time for rearmament against Germany. British leaders understood the Nazi menace and did not expect that appeasement would avoid an eventual war with Germany. They believed that by the time of the Rhineland crisis of 1936 the balance of power had already shifted in Germany’sfavor, but that British rearmament would work to reverse the balance by the end of the decade. Appeasement was a strategy to delay an expected confrontation with Germany until the military balance was more favorable.
Fall 2008
"Correspondence: ASEAN, Regional Integration, and State Sovereignty"
International Security, issue 2, volume 33
By Hiro Katsumata, David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith
Hiro Katsumata responds to David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith's Summer 2007 International Security article, "Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order."
