"Good News and Bad in US Public Diplomacy"

Op-Ed, Agence Global

July 28, 2008

Author: Rami Khouri, Senior Fellow, The Dubai Initiative

Belfer Center Programs or Projects: The Dubai Initiative

WASHINGTON, DC -- Since 9/11, the United States public diplomacy program has been one of the great self-induced hoaxes of modern American public life. It has been managed for the most part by a frightening combination of misguided lightweights and over-the-top ideological zealots. So when I heard the other day that a new man was put in charge -- Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs James Glassman -- I read a speech he made to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, outlining his plans and principles.

I sensed for the first time in recent years that perhaps a new rational element was intruding into the legacy of intemperate arrogance that had been the defining hallmark of Washington's public diplomacy program since 2002. To test this hypothesis, I visited Glassman for a chat in his State Department office. My conclusion: There is good news and bad news to report.

The good news is that some changes in style and approach are underway in this arena -- what Glassman diplomatically calls "a shift in emphasis" in US public diplomacy.

He and his colleagues see their mission less as directly explaining American values or fostering a more favorable international perception of the United States, and more about engaging in what he calls the "war of ideas" in Muslim societies. He explains this as follows: "Our mission today in the war of ideas is highly focused. It is to use the tools of ideological engagement -- words, deeds and images -- to create an environment hostile to violent extremism. We want to break the linkages between groups like Al-Qaeda and their target audiences."

The aim is not to persuade foreign audiences to admire or love the United States, but rather "to ensure that negative sentiments and day-to-day grievances toward the United States and its allies do not manifest themselves in the form of violent extremism."

Glassman importantly acknowledges the need to address the sense among many in the Arab-Islamic world and other lands that "the US does not respect and listen to others, or take them seriously."

I nearly fell out of my chair when I heard him use the word "respect" for one of the core principles that should define reciprocal American interaction with people in the Middle East and Asia, because that is such a crucial and largely missing element in this domain. It will be important to see if this shift results in changes on the ground.

The bad news is that major aspects of the US public diplomacy program remain very thin in relevance, credibility and efficacy. The biggest problem is the program's focus on the small number of Al-Qaeda-type terrorists and their potential impact on others in Arab-Islamic societies, especially youth. 

Washington sees itself as helping moderate Muslims avoid falling into the Qaeda camp. It hopes to do this by offering "productive alternatives to violent extremism," to help "divert potential recruits from the violent extremist vision" by using the attractions of entertainment, literature, music, technology, sports, education, and business -- along with religion and politics.

Such an approach perpetuates in milder form the dreamy, diversionary strategy of former public diplomacy chiefs. It excessively focuses on Al-Qaeda rather than fostering stronger ties with the masses of ordinary Middle Eastern men and women who already like and perhaps even covet American values and offerings. It leaves as irresolvable the fact that American policies are so pro-Israeli and pro-Arab-autocrats in the Middle East these policies are core drivers of Arab radicalism and terrorism. And thereby, ironically, it exaggerates and bolsters the terrorists who exploit Islamic rhetoric by saying that the battle with Islamic extremists is "the most important ideological contest of our time."

This policy is gross exaggeration, factually wrong, and politically counter-productive. Moreover, it shows how the trauma of 9/11 in the United States continues to generate political and intellectual distortions.

Perhaps the biggest single tactical error Glassman has made was when he used the heavily pro-Israeli Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) as the venue to roll out his policy three weeks ago. If you laud the most pro-Israeli think tank in Washington as a guiding light for your program - one that is primarily aimed at Arabs and Muslims -- you will alienate key members of your target audience from the start. WINEP's analysis of Arab issues is so heavily characterized by misperceptions, sheer ignorance, gross distortions, chronic misdiagnosis and ideologically-driven frenzy that using it as a starting point for any endeavor in Arab-Islamic societies is sure to send you quickly crashing into a brick wall. WINEP knows Washington and Israel intimately, but not the Arab-Islamic world.

Nevertheless, we should not miss the fact that reasonable men and women seem to be reassessing aspects of America's failed public diplomacy program, which is an adjustment that is as welcome as it is overdue. Arabs and Muslims should engage more directly with this process, so that the sensible folks prevail and the wild men and women are mercifully retired to their ranches.

For more information about this publication please contact the The Dubai Initiative at 617-496-3694.

For Academic Citation:
"Good News and Bad in US Public Diplomacy." Agence Global (2008 Jul 28).