Report - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Non-Compliance

    Author:
  • Pierre Goldschmidt
| July 12, 2008

 

In a study commissioned by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Pierre Goldschmidt, former Deputy Director-General for Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), outlines a new approach to strengthening the IAEA's hand in cases when states violate their safeguards agreements.  Goldschmidt argues that the UN Security Council should pass a generic resolution laying out steps the Security Council would take to deal with any state found to be in violation of its safeguards obligations. Any state which violated its safeguards pact would be required to accept a broader inspection regime going well beyond the Additional Protocol until the IAEA was able to draw the conclusion that all of its nuclear facilities and materials were under safeguards.  Goldschmidt offers a draft text for the resolution and for the "Model Temporary Complementary Protocol" that defines the broader inspection regime, along with an article-by-article analysis.

 

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For Academic Citation: Goldschmidt, P.. “IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Non-Compliance.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 12, 2008.
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