Analysis & Opinions

Stephen Walt argues that because no one knows what Putin might do, NATO's European members should increase their defense capabilities and correct any obvious vulnerabilities. At the same time, however, the United States and its NATO allies should acknowledge Russia's legitimate security concerns and consider what they can do to allay them.

Stephen Walt writes that those who favor foreign policy restraint believe the United States should trade and invest in other countries, encourage other states to do the same, and be open to managed immigration instead of building walls in a fit of xenophobia.

Stephen Walt argues that bringing Ukraine into NATO now is a bad idea that will prolong the war and leave Kyiv in an even worse position over time.

Stephen Walt elaborates on the multiple obstacles that Europe faces on the way to military autonomy.

Stephen Walt writes that the differences in foreign policy will be less significant than one may think. Consider how Trump and Biden would each likely deal with the three most important items on the current foreign-policy agenda: Ukraine, China, and the Middle East.

Stephen Walt argues that Henry Kissinger's concerns about the destabilizing impact of ideas made him hypersensitive to the smallest perturbations in strategically marginal countries and inclined him to overreact to them in ways that other realists opposed.

Stephen Walt analyzes how the war in Gaza will have widespread geopolitical effects.

Stephen Walt analyzes the costs and benefits of forming alliances. When powerful and stable states face the same threats that the United States does, forming an alliance with them makes good sense. Adding weak and vulnerable members to an alliance may not strengthen it, and long-standing partnerships become less effective if some members let their own military capabilities languish. Another problem with the overzealous pursuit of new partners is the possibility that their agendas will be incompatible with those of the United States. 

Stephen Walt's analysis of the morality of the war in Ukraine includes the following reasoning: But I wish hardliners would acknowledge that their uncompromising approach to the war could do more harm to Ukraine in the long run. Not because that is what hardliners want, but because that is what their policy recommendations may produce.

Joseph S. Nye writes that following the first Republican debate of the U.S. presidential primary season, there is good reason to worry about what a Republican victory in 2024 would mean for the U.S.-led global order. History suggests that when Americans embrace retrenchment, much more than just liberal internationalist principles suffer for it.