Asia & the Pacific

In this deeply personal book, Joseph Nye shares his own journey living through the American century.

In contrast to Nye’s definition of soft power compared to US “hard” power and diplomatic supremacy, it was Hu Jintao in 2007 who first used the term at the 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party to link “the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation to the ability of China to deploy cultural soft power (文化软实力)” (Hu, 2007). Subsequently in 2009, Hu Jintao emphasized that “[China] should strengthen public diplomacy and humanities diplomacy and commence various kinds of cultural exchange activities in order to disseminate China’s great culture” (Hu, 2009). While the phrase “soft power” often echoes Nye’s original vision, the idea’s central premise—that power is wielded through institutions to shape values—is very much in line with the Confucian idea of leadership by moral elites (德治天下); a philosophy that applies in the same way in both domestic and international contexts. Hu Jintao perceived the Chinese government’s influence on its own people as the primary determinant of China’s influence abroad. That ethos has carried over across China’s political and economic arenas.

The application of soft power in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) can be characterized as both ethno- and geo-centric. Parts of the MENA region began exercising soft power via pan-Arab solidarity movements during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and after the founding of the Arab League in 1945. Driven by upper- and middle-class urban actors, these movements were multi-faceted and centered around promoting pan-Arab soft power tools—such as culture and the Arabic language— as a departure from the region’s history of Western colonialism. While religious and the nationalist ideologies have since eclipsed pan-Arabism’s regional prominence, soft power remains a key tool for MENA diplomacy, particularly in the Gulf countries touting strong and wealthy state institutions. Saudi Arabia has seized soft power as a diplomatic tool through successfully branding its Vision 2030 strategy as a policy for opening the nation up to the rest of the world. Similarly, the Emirates’ own Vision 2030 agenda and Dubai’s hosting of Expo 2020 have become a symbol of the Emirates’ economic vitality and resource diversification beyond oil. Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup 2022 is widely viewed as the zenith of mega-events in the MENA region, having put the city state firmly on the map. Religious tourism—including the Hajj pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, the Shia pilgrimage in Iraq, and visiting biblical sites in both Jordan and Palestine—is another tool by which MENA governments exercise soft power and attract foreigners from abroad.

For the United States, the dominant approach has been economic coercion. Despite applying stringent sanctions, the United States has been ineffective in convincing North Korea to give up its nuclear arsenal in return for a brighter economic and diplomatic future. The myriad U.S. sanctions have also failed to halt major progress in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. However, these setbacks have not caused the United States to change its strategy of economic coercion. On the contrary, the United States has considerably increased its use of this economic statecraft tool. In contrast, China has deepened its economic engagement with the North Korean regime since the late 2000s. Through the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and its counterpart the Workers’ Party of Korea, China has cultivated and monetized political ties. Doing so has provided a powerful mechanism through which the Kim family regime—leaders of North Korea’s ruling and prosperous 1 percent—has shored up stability and thrived.

In his new book, The Avoidable War?, former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd demystifies the actions of the U.S. and China, explaining and translating them for the benefit of the other. Geopolitical disaster is still avoidable, but only if these two giants can find a way to coexist without betraying their core interests through what Rudd calls “managed strategic competition.” Should they fail, down that path lies the possibility of a war that could rewrite the future of both countries, and the world.

Number One Realist illuminates Bernard Fall's study of political reconciliation in Indochina, while showing how his profound, humanitarian critique of war continues to echo in the endless conflicts of the present. It will challenge and change the way we think about the Vietnam War.

In The Devil Never Sleeps,  Juliette Kayyem lays the groundwork for a new “fail safely” approach to dealing with disasters. The book shares lessons on how to better prepare for that moment. Kayyem examines notable crises, like the Challenger explosion, California wildfires, and the power outage at Super Bowl XLVII, detailing the choices people made along the way and how they impacted outcomes.

Capital Choices analyzes the creation of different SWFs from a comparative political economy perspective, arguing that different state-society structures at the sectoral level are the drivers for SWF variation. Juergen Braunstein focuses on the early formation period of SWFs, a critical but little understood area given the high levels of political sensitivity and lack of transparency that surround SWF creation. Braunstein’s novel analytical framework provides practical lessons for the business and finance organizations and policymakers of countries that have created, or are planning to create, SWFs.

While China is building nuclear reactors faster than any other country in the world, major constraints may limit nuclear energy’s ability to grow to the scale of hundreds of gigawatts that would be required for it to play a major part in decarbonizing China’s energy system. This chapter explores the major constraints on, and risks of, large-scale nuclear energy growth in China, and how both new policies and new technologies might address them. It focuses particularly on the two biggest constraints – economics and siting. Substantial government policies to support nuclear power and advanced reactor systems designed to address some of the key constraints are both likely to be needed for nuclear to have a chance of playing a major role in decarbonizing China’s energy system; nuclear energy’s role may be bigger in the second half of this century than in the first half.

How can China make good on its pledge to reach carbon neutrality by 2060? In Foundations for a Low-Carbon Energy System in China, a team of experts from China and the United States explains how China's near-term climate and energy policies can affect long-term decarbonization pathways beyond 2030, building the foundations for a smoother and less costly national energy transformation.