International Relations

Joseph Nye argues that episodes of "declinism" say more about popular psychology than geo-political analysis, but they also show how the idea of decline touches a raw nerve in American politics. China is not an existential threat to the United States unless U.S. leaders make it one by blundering into a major war.

Joseph Nye argues that the "one China" formula, if combined with other measures to bolster deterrence against any sudden acts of aggression, can still help to keep the peace.

This week in Say More, Project Syndicate talks with Joseph S. Nye, Jr., an emeritus professor at Harvard Kennedy School, a former U.S. assistant secretary of defense, and the author, most recently, of A Life in the American Century.

Joseph S. Nye warns that populist nationalism at home is by far the greatest threat to U.S. power.

In this deeply personal book, Joseph Nye shares his own journey living through the American century.

The U.S. position in the global value chain puts it at a disadvantage, and Washington's confrontational policies are making things worse.

In the Henty Mance interview, Joseph Nye, who coined term 'soft power,' says that the turmoil facing the United States and Harvard was worse in the 1960s.

Joseph Nye writes that Washington's strategy towards Beijing should be to avoid either a hot or cold war, co-operate when possible and marshal its assets to shape China's external behaviour. This can be done through deterrence and a strengthening of both alliances and international institutions.

During foreign policy disputes involving China and some of its most important commercial partners, why do local leaders punish or protect foreign commercial actors? The decision comes down to the political incentives facing each local leader. Understanding this variation is important because how local leaders treat foreign businesses can influence the overall effectiveness of the Chinese government’s economic coercion against foreign states. 

Power transitions affect a state’s ability to exercise economic statecraft. As a dominating and a rising power approach parity, they face structural incentives to decouple their economies. This decoupling affects business-state relations: high-value businesses within the dominant power tend to oppose their state’s economic statecraft because of its costs to them, whereas low-value businesses within the rising power tend to cooperate because they gain from it.