International Security & Defense

Mariana Budjeryn reflects on the tenth anniversary of her native Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity.

Calder Walton recounts the succession of intelligence failures against the West over which Russian President Vladimir Putin has presided, the greatest of which being his decision to invade Ukraine.

Why does the U.S. Army rely on persuasion to influence military partners to improve their forces despite repeated failures that undermine U.S. foreign policy goals? The army prioritizes its role as a fighting force, not an advisory group. U.S. leaders have developed an ideology—the cult of the persuasive—to advance army bureaucratic interests.

Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs today announced the appointment of Lori Garver and Beth Sanner as non-resident Senior Fellows. Garver is a former Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) and current CEO of Earthrise Alliance. Sanner was Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration and is now Professor of Practice at the University of Maryland's Applied Research Lab for Intelligence Security. They will both share their experience and expertise with students and faculty of Harvard Kennedy School and the greater Harvard community.      

William L. d'Ambruoso writes that ruthlessness does not guarantee success, but it usually proves necessary — a difficult truth that should sit uneasily with democratic counterinsurgents who are supposed to care about human rights. 

Jacqueline Hazelton writes that regimes battling a counterinsurgency often depend on corruption to stay in power.

Winning hearts and minds doesn't defeat insurgent groups, author Jacqueline Hazelton argues. So why does the United States still rely on counterinsurgency?

Jacqueline L. Hazelton analyzes why the United States fails at counterinsurgency in light of its withdrawal from Afghanistan. She asserts that the belief that democracy is necessary for long-term stability and can flow from the barrel of a gun is rooted in misleading accounts of past counterinsurgency campaigns, such as the Malayan Emergency and the 1948–1954 insurgency in the Philippines.

Stephen Walt writes that understanding why it was so hard to end the Afghan war could teach future presidents two valuable lessons: It is usually easier to invade a foreign country than it is to leave it, and wars of choice should never be waged for frivolous or ill-considered reasons.

Joseph S. Nye: U.S. and China Need a More Cooperative Security Stance