International Security & Defense

10 Items

Iran’s uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz, May 2009.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

Testimony

Iran’s Noncompliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency Obligations

| March 24, 2015

Preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons is vital to U.S. national security interests. A key aspect of that matter is Iran’s compliance with its Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and with other related agreements. It is a broad subject, but I understand the Committee has specific interests, so I will confine my statement to those topics.

President Barack Obama delivers remarks at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, Germany, June 19, 2013. He called for a reduction in global nuclear weapons through more negotiations with Russia.

White House Photo

Policy Brief - PacNet Newsletter

The United States, China, and Nuclear Arms Control: Time for a Creative Spark

| August 8, 2013

While the United States and Russia have a responsibility to draw down their arsenals, these bilateral nuclear reductions will be increasingly difficult if other nuclear powers do not join in....[I]t is time to engage the so-called "second tier" nuclear powers, especially China. The evolution of the US-China strategic relationship can affect the next stages of international arms control, even if China does not directly participate.

Former soldiers with the South Korean Headquarters of Intelligence Detachment unit tear a North Korean flag during a rally against North Korea in Seoul, South Korea, May 20, 2010. South Korea accused North Korea of sinking a naval warship in March.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - United States Institute of Peace

After the Cheonan Investigation Report: What's Next?

| May 20, 2010

"While few observers take North Korea's threat of an all-out war seriously, many experts are concerned that the sinking of the Cheonan may be indicative of a North Korea that is emboldened by its perception of itself as a nuclear power that can now carry out limited strikes without fear of large-scale retaliation."

South Korean Navy's Ship Salvage Unit members on rubber boats search for missing sailors of the sunken South Korean navy ship Cheonan off South Korea's Baengnyeong Island, Apr. 3, 2010.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - United States Institute of Peace

The Sinking of South Korea's Naval Vessel: A Major Turning Point

| April 2010

"Many in South Korea have already reached their own conclusion — the Cheonan incident is a stark reminder that North Korea remains a clear and present danger. A growing South Korean view is that more than a decade of nuclear drama, food shortages, starvation, borderline economic collapse, and currency reform debacles, followed by bailouts from progressive South Korean governments and the Communist Party of China has made the international community complacent about the direct military threat that North Korea poses. The Cheonan is a wake-up call."

Former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez at a commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the end of El Salvador's brutal 12-year civil war, in Madrid, Jan. 12, 2007. Spain's government, then led by Gonzalez, helped both sides reach peace terms.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Rethinking Rebellions: A New Approach to Ending Civil War

April 2010

"...[V]ictory means that the government or rebel military is left intact. Rebel victories are more stable than government ones because the rebels are not only in a position to harm (or threaten harm) their populations but also to benefit them. In winning, a rebel military organization remains capable of containing moves against its government. But because it is a rebel organization, it must to appeal to a portion of its domestic audience for approval as well as also to an international community not predisposed to the overthrow of national governments. This is also consistent with the move toward the greatest level of democratization following rebel victories. Rebels need to buttress the legitimacy of their win: allowing greater liberalization of the political system is an effective means to doing so."

This Sept. 26, 2009 satellite file image shows a facility under construction inside a mountain located about 20 miles north northeast of Qom, Iran.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Beyond Zero Enrichment: Suggestions for an Iranian Nuclear Deal

| November 2009

"Some form of negotiated agreement, if it can be achieved, is the “least bad” option for U.S. interests—but is likely to have to include some continuing enrichment in Iran. There are real security risks in agreeing to permit some ongoing enrichment in Iran, but if appropriately managed, these security risks are less than those created by a military strike or allowing Iran to continue unfettered enrichment with no agreement."

Traders from Pakistani Kashmir wave after crossing onto the Indian side of Kashmir's de facto border, the Line of Control (LoC), Oct. 9, 2008. A delegation of traders from Pakistani Kashmir arrived in Indian Kashmir to hold talks on cross-LoC trade.

AP Photo

Policy Brief - Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Slow but Steady on Kashmir

| January 2009

Instead of special envoys and summits, the U.S. should adopt a "quiet diplomacy" approach that offers incentives to India and Pakistan for making tangible, if small, progress on the ground in Kashmir. The U.S. should offer to help fund sustained local policy initiatives in both Indian and Pakistani-administered Kashmir aimed at improving governance and encouraging economic exchange and the movement of people across the Line of Control. An initiative focused on local government and civil society lacks the drama of shuttle diplomacy and grand bargains, but can actually improve the daily lives of Kashmiris while giving them more say over their own governance.

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Policy Brief - Institute for Contemporary Affairs

Dilemmas of Israeli Policy after the Hamas Victory: From Disengagement to Consolidation?

| March 30, 2006

"...it is clear that unilateral measures, in and of themselves, are an inherently undesirable course of action, that they will not bring an end to violence and terror, nor enable the resolution of the truly difficult issues...."