Nuclear Issues

678 Items

Journal Article - 1540 Compass

Evolving State and Nonstate Proliferation Threats

| Winter 2016

UN Security Council resolution 1540 has come a long way since it was approved over a decade ago. Initially, many countries questioned the legitimacy of the Security Council “legislating” requirements for countries all over the world, and there were wide gaps in both reporting and action. Today, UNSCR 1540 is a broadly accepted part of the international landscape, only a few countries have not yet provided at least basic reporting on steps taken under the resolution, and many countries have taken action to fulfill the resolution’s requirements, ranging from enacting export control laws to strengthening security for biological pathogens.

Panel

Benn Craig

Analysis & Opinions - Future of Diplomacy Project

Conversations in Diplomacy: Professor Muriel Rouyer and Ambassador Boris Ruge

| Feb. 27, 2017

In this installation of 'Conversations in Diplomacy,' recorded during the Future of Diplomacy Project's annual Europe Week series, guests Muriel Rouyer and Boris Ruge speak with Professor Nicholas Burns about the rise of populism in Europe, the potential outcomes of upcoming elections in France and Germany, and the effect of such factors on the transatlantic relationship.

Analysis & Opinions - The Conversation

How Governments and Companies Can Prevent the Next Insider Attack

| Feb. 20, 2017

Now that they are in office, President Donald Trump and his team must protect the nation from many threats – including from insiders. Insider threats could take many forms, such as the next Edward Snowden, who leaked hundreds of thousands of secret documents to the press, or the next Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood mass killer.

President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

AP

Analysis & Opinions - The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs

How Trump Can Strengthen the U.S.-Japan Alliance

| Feb. 17, 2017

Last week’s meeting between President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe went surprisingly well, but if this summit is the baseline test of Mr. Trump’s capacity to handle foreign policy and national security challenges, then the bar may be set too low, because rising tensions in East Asia will almost surely test the administration in the future.

teaser image

Analysis & Opinions - Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Iran’s Missile Tests Reveal Weaknesses of UN Security Council Resolution

| Feb. 08, 2017

Iran’s latest missile test on January 29 received a swift response, as warranted. The United Nations Security Council called for an emergency session, and on February 2, the U.S. Treasury imposed new sanctions on persons and entities involved with Tehran’s ballistic missile program. Iran responded equally swiftly. An Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander proclaimed that a separate, large-scale military missile exercise underway in Semnan province was intended to “showcase the power of Iran’s revolution and to dismiss the sanctions.” Officials in Iran have vowed to continue testing ballistic missiles and dismissed claims that its program is a cover to develop long-range projectiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The United States and its allies should demand that Tehran uphold its obligation not to conduct tests of nuclear-capable ballistic or cruise missiles.

Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant

AP

Analysis & Opinions - Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Ensuring Iran’s Enrichment R&D is for Peaceful Purposes

| January 26, 2017

Iran announced last week that it would start feeding its first IR-8 centrifuges with uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6). The 2015 Iran nuclear deal states that Tehran’s breakout time (the time needed to enrich uranium enough for a nuclear bomb) is one year, but that is based on Iran only using the first-generation, less-efficient IR-1 centrifuges. With more powerful IR-8s and other advanced centrifuges, Iran could enrich uranium for a weapon much faster. In three to four years, the country could be able to deploy large numbers of advanced centrifuges – if it can convince the international community that its nuclear program is peaceful and that it should be treated like any other nation, without restriction on its nuclear and enrichment activities.

Rouhani

Russia President

Blog Post - Iran Matters

A Possible Trump Administration’s Iran Policy: Constraints and Options

    Author:
  • Ephraim Kam
| Jan. 20, 2017

A key foreign affairs issue for the Trump administration will be its policy on Iran, as was the case also for the Obama administration. But we have no idea what approach it will take, an uncertainty amplified by the fact that Trump has no experience whatsoever in foreign policy, and no idea whose input he will accept in shaping it. It’s not as if we have no information about his attitude – during the election campaign, Trump made his intention on Iran very clear – but, as with other topics, it is unclear how he will act when once he is forced to translate his intentions into action and realizes that reality is far more complicated than he imagined.

Japanese Flag

Grantuking/Flickr

Analysis & Opinions - Japan Forward

Japanese Nuclear Weapons Would Make Japan Less Safe, Not More

| January 18, 2017

This is not the first time that the idea of a Japanese nuclear capability has been floated: In the late 1960s, after the first Chinese nuclear test, the Japanese government under Eisaku Sato sanctioned multiple feasibility studies on how much time and money Japan would need to develop nuclear weapons. However, these studies unanimously argued against making the political decision to build the bomb, citing the tremendous losses Japan would incur in the forms of insecurity, economic costs, and damage to its diplomatic relations in the international community.

Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant

Wikimedia Commons

Policy Brief - Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Iran Stockpiling Uranium Far Above Current Needs

| January 10, 2017

In a televised speech on January 1, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Tehran had imported 200 metric tons of yellowcake uranium and would import another 120 tons at an unspecified future date. The imports are permitted by the nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), but nonetheless significantly exceed Iran’s needs for natural (that is, unenriched) uranium over the next 15 years. Iran’s import of such high levels of uranium suggests it may be stockpiling uranium to reach nuclear breakout before the deal’s initial limitations expire in 2031.

The JCPOA permits Iran to buy natural uranium to “replenish” its stocks as it sells enriched uranium on the international market. To date, Iran has had difficulties locating a buyer for its enriched uranium stocks – unsurprising, given the current excess of commercially available enriched uranium. This, however, has not stopped Iran from buying and stockpiling more yellowcake.