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If Not Balancing, What?
Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony¹

Jeremy Pressman

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While traditional understandings of international affairs would predict the formation of a balancing coalition against the dominant U.S. position in world affairs, some analysts now contend that the U.S. advantage is so comprehensive and so unprecedented that we have not seen and will not see balancing behavior on the part of second tier powers like China, Russia, Japan, and Germany. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the absence of balancing means the United States will not face any meaningful opposition in the international arena. Though in the short term a bloc of states is unlikely to form a counter-coalition—the historical form of resistance to dominant powers—other states still find important ways to resist U.S. dominance.

If not balancing, what? The current emphasis on U.S. power and dominance wrongly implies that nothing other than balancing is consequential, yet resistance short of balancing could still significantly undermine U.S. interests. Furthermore, today's forms of resistance to U.S. hegemony could serve as the building blocks for balancing against the United States down the road.

What, then, are these forms of resistance? While the past decade of U.S. hegemony does not offer a crystal clear road map, it does suggest several different avenues by which states and disaffected peoples will resist U.S. hegemony.

First, states can resist by withholding cooperation. Even the United States, perhaps the most dominant great power in history, still needs cooperation from far weaker states on a host of issues such as the intelligence and police work needed to combat global terrorism. This gives those who are needed some leverage over the United States.

Second, the war of words, symbols, and images does not simply reflect the will and ideas of the strongest country. Other countries utilize rhetorical attacks and symbolic protests against U.S. policy in an effort to win the verbal war for hearts and minds at home and abroad. They

may hope to sway the American public. Anti-American actors rely in part on words to overcome material inferiority to the United States, win recruits, and build support for anti-U.S. violence.

Third, a few actors look for shortcuts to overcome the massive imbalance in military capabilities. They resort to two tactics of the weak: terrorism and the possession of non-conventional weapons. While terrorism has long been seen as a weapon of the weak, recent events in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea are shedding light on the various ways in which nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons may now be seen as a way of deflecting unwanted attention from Washington. In projecting American military power around the globe, the United States has created the impression that non-conventional weapons are the best form of defense against the American empire.

Fourth, the specific economic relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United States does not fit the general pattern of U.S. dominance, which opens the door to American-European economic confrontations. The EU has some economic weight to throw around when it disagrees with U.S. economic policy or wants to resist U.S. economic dictates. The EU can thus engage, for example, in trade wars with the United States, even if the EU lacks the military might to engage in military disagreements.

In discussing the topic of resistance in this paper, I address both non-cooperation and active, militant opposition. There are reasons to treat the two separately, but I include both here so as to get a full picture of the international reaction to the current powerful American position.

In the rest of this paper, I briefly describe the major aspects of U.S. hegemony. I then turn to each avenue in fuller detail. Next, I assess the linkage between resistance and balancing and offer policy changes that might mitigate resistance. I conclude by suggesting, more generally, six ways that weak states may challenge the great powers.

AMERICAN HEGEMONY

The United States has or is capable of having a dramatic impact on almost every country in the world. The United States has the largest gross domestic product in the world. In fact, the U.S. share comprises about 33% of the global gross domestic product (GDP). Japan is a distant second with just over 13%. The United States is the top consumer of world energy, accounting for 25% of total consumption, followed in 2001 by China (9.2%) and Russia (7%). The three largest companies in the world—Wal-Mart, Exxon Mobil, and General Motors—are all American, as are six of the top ten companies in Fortune's Global 500. Franchises of American fast food chains and other retail outlets often serve as the public symbol of American commercial success.

The economic trend is also likely to persist for the coming years. Fareed Zakaria put it well:

With 5 percent of the world's population, this one country accounts for 43 percent of the world's economic production, 40 percent of its high-technology production and 50 percent of its research and development. If you look at the indicators of future growth, all are favorable for America. It is more dynamic economically, more youthful demographically and more flexible culturally than any other part of the world.²

Not only is the United States economy on top, but it may not even have reached its peak yet. The rapid recovery of the American economic and political system in the days after September 11, 2001 demonstrated the system's resilience.

In terms of military capabilities and power projection, the United States also occupies a commanding position. As Brooks and Wohlforth noted, the United States will spend more on defense in 2003 than the next 15-20 countries combined. Furthermore, it has "overwhelming nuclear superiority, the world's dominant air force, the only true blue-water navy, and a unique capability to project power around the globe."³

U.S. forces seem to be based or deployed everywhere: in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Colombia, Germany, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Philippines, South Korea, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and throughout the Gulf region (including Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia). The United States has had the economic strength to develop and build a potent military force with superior technology. But it also has put it on display around the globe as a result of the Cold War, military intervention and peacekeeping, and now the war on terrorism.

One caveat is that U.S. engagement in international affairs is predicated on continued domestic support for such a grandiose role. If, instead, the American public will tire of playing global cop and consequently push for withdrawal from the international arena as Charles Kupchan has suggested, the absence of balancing will be irrelevant. U.S. withdrawal from international affairs would be largely self-imposed rather than the result of a future counter-alliance that would force the United States from the scene.⁴ Whether the American public is as committed to disengagement as Kupchan claims is a central question that demands a full (and separate) inquiry.

WITHHOLDING COOPERATION

When other countries disapprove of U.S. policy, they can resist by reducing cooperation that is essential for the advancement of U.S. interests. For counter-terrorism, drug trafficking or intelligence-sharing, non-cooperation by less powerful states hurts U.S. efforts. Although the United States is dominant in many realms, a hyperpower still needs cooperation in some areas.

By virtue of geography, some states have unique assets that the United States covets. For instance, once the United States decided to target Iraq in 2002-03, certain nearby real estate

became very important. Kuwait was quick to support the U.S. effort, but Turkey held out for much more. The importance of the Turkish parliament's vote against granting the U.S. military greater access was based largely on the geographic cards Turkey holds. Longtime U.S. bases are not immune to opposition either, as the United States experienced in the Philippines and more recently in Okinawa.

On cooperation more generally, the war against al-Qaeda is illustrative. The United States has worked with a wide range of states including Britain, Pakistan, Spain, Syria, and Uzbekistan. Such support is essential for gathering intelligence and conducting international police work. To some extent, the United States can pressure other countries to cooperate. But the depth of cooperation is always going to be in part a reflection of how willing the American partner is to cooperate. If the United States is too aggressive or dismissive of local concerns, countries often drag their feet and slow the flow of information, evidence, or suspects.

Or, even worse from the U.S. perspective, a government could be toppled or voted out of office because it is seen as too much of a U.S. puppet. Indirect or proxy rule played an important role during the Cold War and continues to be a central element in U.S. foreign policy. By relying on local allies, Washington shares the costs of U.S. policy and gleans information from those more familiar with a particular security scene. For opponents of U.S. policy, this means that even if they cannot directly confront the United States, they still may be strong enough to challenge a local U.S. ally.

The dilemma of non-cooperation was also exemplified in other ways during the buildup to a war with Iraq. Iraq assisted UN inspectors just enough so that some countries believed inspections were working even as Britain and the United States continued to decry Iraqi non-compliance. In other words, Iraq appeared very aware of the possibility that its potential

opponents could be divided by carefully calibrated Iraqi actions; Iraqi policy contributed to non-cooperation by standard U.S. allies like France or Germany.

Opponents of the war on Iraq used the threat of non-cooperation to slow the drive to war. Once the United States asked for things like UN support for the war, financial support for reconstruction, and NATO involvement in getting ready, the door was open for meaningful non-cooperation. Vetoing UNSC resolutions, withholding funds for the post-war reconstruction of Iraq, or preventing military preparations in Turkey under the NATO umbrella are all ways of resisting U.S. preferences.

If other countries always had the same interests and policies as the United States, withholding cooperation would be counterproductive. Yet even close U.S. allies sometimes have different objectives. They may judge and prioritize threats differently; or, when they share the U.S. interest, they often favor a different policy to realize that interest. Whether based on different interests or different policy preferences to pursue shared interests, putative allies may not feel inhibited about undermining the U.S. approach. This would be especially true when siding too closely with Washington could increase domestic political opposition and mobilize a strong challenge to regime survival.

WORDS AND SYMBOLS

International actors have a wide array of options today for the distribution of information. The existence of international media—be they satellite channels, global news networks, internet sites, or newspapers that publish on multiple continents—has meant that smaller actors can get

an international voice. Both Iraq and al-Qaeda have used outlets owned and controlled by others to disseminate their anti-American viewpoints.

Battles over images and information provide an arena for the less powerful to win new recruits and generate popular sympathy for their cause. The media draws attention to acts of violence and any resulting casualties and fear. It also widely disseminates statements made by leaders who could not hope to be heard by so many people without a major boost from the press.

How does getting the word out help lesser players? Actors who are weak in material terms can win battles of perceptions to overcome more powerful parties. Large states may back off if they become convinced that their seemingly weaker adversary will, for instance, pay any cost, fight to the last man, or respect no moral limits. Symbolic action can be a tool of resistance for weaker parties. In the spring of 2002, when Israeli troops entered parts of the occupied territories nominally under the control of the Palestinian Authority, some Arabs across the region responded by boycotting goods tied to Israel's benefactor, the United States. Never mind that U.S. exports to the Middle East comprised just 2.5% of the U.S total in 2000. By avoiding Starbucks coffee or Pampers diapers, Arab protesters hoped to send a message to America even if they could not hope to make a dent in America's real economic performance.

Another effect of words and symbols is that they can be used to undermine both domestic and international support for U.S. policies. The open American system, international media, and foreign lobbying create opportunities for those opposed to U.S. policy to win over both segments of the American public and U.S. supporters in other countries. The battle for hearts and minds is a two way street: while Washington is trying to build domestic support and win non-U.S. support, foreign opponents of U.S. policy are trying to convince the U.S. public as well as non-U.S. peoples. As became clear with Iraq, opponents can range from longtime allies like France

and Germany to the very target of the war, Iraq. In a system that values debate and the clash of ideas, words and symbols can be used to make it harder for the United States to pursue and protect its interests.

Words, for example, stopped the United States from getting the UN blessing for the war on Iraq. In hindsight, the absence of the United Nations or some form of the international community meant the loss of access to Turkey during the war and greater difficulty getting aid and personnel to provide security and help with reconstruction.

At the end of the day, words are free if the topic is of interest to the international media. With the right message, any bit player can lambaste the United States, even if the words are not backed by material capabilities. Rhetorical assaults can increase the impact of other tactics such as non-cooperation, or, as we see in the next section, asymmetric warfare.

VIOLENCE OF THE WEAK: TERRORISM AND WMD

The third avenue for resisting American hegemony includes a core instrument of statecraft: violence. But if the American military is so powerful, how can smaller actors possibly hope to compete in the military arena? The answer lies in two methods that seek to level the playing field, namely, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Both terrorism and non-conventional weapons allow states to significantly harm U.S. interests even in a world without balancing.

Tank for tank, no other military can compete with the United States. On the conventional battlefield, the United States is always the odds-on favorite. Other actors could defeat the United States—maybe they care more, maybe they are willing to absorb endless losses, maybe support

in the United States for a particular conflict might lessen over time, maybe the adversary would adopt better tactics—but most of the time the vast qualitative edge will be sufficient.

But if adversaries can take the United States out of the conventional realm, they have some hope of achieving their political objectives. While it is highly unlikely that terrorism and non-conventional weapons will bring about the collapse of the U.S. empire, they could force the United States to make some modifications and pay higher costs. On the regional level, they might allow some U.S. adversaries to bully local states.

Terrorism is an attractive alternative because it is inexpensive, decentralized, and capable of causing widespread problems for one's adversary. One sniper team (of Americans) created deep anxiety and changed countless routines in Washington DC for weeks. While the DC snipers may not have had a political objective, one can easily imagine an al-Qaeda effort to try to replicate such an attack in cities around the United States. The anthrax attacks in the United States in the fall of 2001 are another model. Effective terrorists get a large return on a small investment. Moreover, globalization continues to strengthen the hands of the few who wish to sow fear or wreak havoc in large, open societies like the United States.

Terrorism can also bring about policy change. With the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda forced a significant re-orientation of American policy. The attack led to one war (Afghanistan) and served as a central rationale for a second (Iraq). The war on terrorism has come to dominate Bush's foreign policy and will result in hundreds of billions of dollars in new governmental spending.

The attack on 9/11 demonstrated the vulnerability of an open, capitalist society. The same freedoms that form the core of the American constitutional system create space for militants to operate and carry out anti-American activities. The same elements that allow for an efficient, free

market system also serve as potentially devastating points of attack. What makes the United States liberal is also what makes it an easy target. Conversely, then, making the United States a harder target means compromising liberal notions in both the political and economic realms.

The second, and potentially related, tool of the weak is the pursuit of non-conventional weapons. Nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons can give states power and influence to a degree that would require much more costly conventional forces. Such weapons are capable of causing significant death and destruction; they also create the potential for deterrence and compellence at the regional level. States may develop non-conventional weapons in order to blackmail neighbors who are not similarly armed.

Non-conventional weapons help states resist U.S. pressure. True, Iraq has been highlighted and ostracized for its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. But India and Pakistan both went nuclear despite U.S. opposition. Iran and North Korea, to different degrees, have had success with nuclear research. What lessons did other states take away from the U.S.-led war on Iraq in 1991? Better to get your non-conventional weapons before you are a U.S. target. One can imagine both Iran and North Korea, though especially the latter, as pursuing the weapons so as to better resist a possible U.S. offensive, be it rhetorical or material.

THE EU EXCEPTION

Even in the core economic and military areas of American power, the disparity is not equal. To the extent that the European Union can act as a single entity on economic matters, this gives the EU a more balanced relationship with the United States on economic matters. This is in

sharp contrast to the military arena where the U.S. advantage is commanding or the political arena where the EU members are far from united on defense and foreign policy issues.

The EU has significant economic leverage by which to resist and counter U.S. efforts. The economy of the EU, at \$7.9 trillion, is not dwarfed by the U.S. economy at \$10.2 trillion (2001). On foreign direct investment (FDI), one half of U.S. FDI is invested in EU countries, while close to 60% of European FDI is invested in the United States.

Not surprisingly, then, the two sides frequently joust over economic matters. Trade sanctions, often with the help of the World Trade Organization (WTO), are not unheard of. The EU has banned U.S.-beef with hormones for years, despite a 1999 WTO ruling awarding over \$100 million in damages. The EU has also stymied imports of genetically modified foods unless they are labeled as such, a step opposed by the United States. After years of bickering over Europe's banana quotas that favored certain banana exporters, the EU agreed to drop the quotas in 2006 (the United States also lifted close to \$200 million in retaliatory tariffs it imposed in 1999).

Conversely, European officials loudly protested a number of U.S. policies such as tax breaks for U.S. exporters, tariffs on imported steel, and U.S. farm subsidies. In January 2002, the WTO sided with the EU on the first matter when it concluded that the foreign sales corporation (FSC) tax provisions were illegal export subsidies. WTO decisions in 2003 forced the Bush administration to eliminate steel tariffs. Though the WTO is still in its early years, the initial record of EU-U.S. trade relations suggests that the EU is willing both to defend its practices against U.S. complaints and to challenge U.S. policies that the EU deems unfair. In either case, the EU is willing to risk sanctions and trade wars.

The EU is unlikely to suddenly become united on political questions and thereby counter the American hegemon in the military and political arena.⁵ Yet the EU is able to use its economic strength to equalize its relationship with the hegemon on financial matters. Power is both the parts and the sum of the parts. Actors who are woefully inadequate to resist in total still may be able to offset U.S. pressure in the area where they are least weak.

RESISTANCE AS A PRECURSOR TO BALANCING

Resistance to U.S. dominance will harm U.S. interests in the near future, but it will also have a longer term impact on balancing against the United States. In two different but related ways, resistance today will set the stage for balancing tomorrow.

First, the futility of resistance in bringing about fundamental change in the international system or in stopping major U.S. policy initiatives (e.g., the inability to stop the U.S. drive to war in Iraq) may motivate states to consider what it would take to start to move toward balancing. Resistance can cause the United States harm, but it alone cannot topple the United States or force the United States to heed criticism. If states often find that resistance alone is not enough to protect their interests, the second tier of powers below the United States might consider balancing.

Second, cooperation in resisting the United States may help states develop diplomatic and institutional links that set the stage for alliances, joint military exercises, and, more broadly, the development of mutual interests. Diplomats fighting U.S. policy at the United Nations and comrades in arms fighting U.S. forces on the ground may create organizational and normative ties that grow larger over time.

These two claims matter little if the structural image of automatic balancing is correct.

Kenneth Waltz presented balancing as a recurrent feature of international politics; a system out of balance, as is the current state of affairs, will come back to equilibrium with or without intentional action on the part of states.⁶

Such an approach, however, seemingly takes away the role of human agency in politics. Even if Waltz is correct that balancing against the United States is inevitable, the timing and nature of that balancing process could vary greatly. Will it take place in 20 years or 120 years? Will the quality of the shift be more like Britain's acceptance of being displaced by the United States at the turn of the century or like the great wars that were necessary to topple Napoleon's France and Hitler's Germany? Differences in timing and quality may matter little to theorists; after all, balancing is balancing. For policymakers, however, the exact opposite is true as such distinctions make for very different policy environments.

If the United States is seen as a threat and resistance is insufficient, states then have to decide what to do to address that threat. They can and do resist, as I have already noted. This may lead to discussions about major policy initiatives that start to move beyond mere resistance and toward balancing. Should China and Russia deepen their 2001 agreement? Should Germany and Japan develop full-fledged conventional militaries and power projection capabilities? Should Britain, France, Germany, or Japan develop a secure second-strike nuclear capability? If so, should Britain and France offer nuclear assistance to Germany and Japan? Should some of these states form a military alliance directed against the United States? As part of such an alliance, should they develop plans to deal with the U.S. threat, hold military exercises, and form joint armed forces? Resistance may prompt discussions on such issues as well as send states down pathways that ultimately lead to the development of balancing capabilities.

MITIGATING RESISTANCE

Resistance harms U.S. interests in the status quo and may negatively affect the timing and nature of balancing in the future. Thus, reducing resistance will reduce damage to U.S. interests today and make the pathway to balancing longer and less confrontational. The United States can take policy steps today that will lessen resistance tomorrow.

Many actors resist the United States because they fear American dominance and coercion. Lessening this fear will, in turn, lessen resistance. The United States has the most powerful armed forces, a formidable collection of weapons of mass destruction, a gigantic economy, the best research and development apparatus, and cultural, commercial, and linguistic appeal. This concentration of power in and of itself frightens other countries. They are also concerned, as Stephen Walt highlighted nearly twenty years ago, with the intentions and motivations of great powers: “Because power can be used either to threaten or to support other states, how states perceive the ways that others will use their power becomes paramount.”⁷ Other countries care about what the United States intends to do with all these capabilities, something the United States signals with its rhetoric and its policies. Other countries are reassured and less fearful of superpower coercion when the United States embraces self-restraint, signals benign intent, and welcomes genuine consultation.⁸

Washington could take a number of specific policy steps to reduce resistance. The United States should take treaties and international institutions more seriously. Adherence to treaties and support for international organizations is a major way for the United States to indicate that it will play by at least some of the same rules as lesser powers. When the Bush administration undermines the Kyoto protocol on climate change, moves to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile

Treaty, and opposes the International Criminal Court, the cumulative effect is to indicate that the United States will play by its own rules and, therefore, use its power advantage as it sees fit, regardless of the international community's standards. States will assume that Washington prefers to intimidate and coerce other countries, thus highlighting the need for self-protection and resistance.

Were the United States to demonstrate greater support of international treaties and institutions, the United States would directly benefit. As more countries buy into an international, rules-based system, Washington needs to expend less energy acting as a global cop.⁹ If the United States opts out of international agreements, more states will recognize the futility of the system and may then be less inclined to rely on international protections. If, in contrast, the United States binds itself to such norms and organizations, states will see the potential of international institutions and work harder to make them function. A web of international agreements could also benefit the United States down the road if and when the United States enters a period of decline. Such a web could lock in features and develop norms that help protect an aging giant.

One can see the importance of the international community in Iraq. Despite pre-war assertions, containment and UN inspections had thwarted Iraq's drive for non-conventional weaponry. After the war, the absence of international involvement probably undermined U.S.-led reconstruction efforts and meant U.S. armed forces were unable to share much of the burden for establishing a stable and secure Iraq.

Informal avenues of contact are equally important. If avenues for quiet consultation exist and are taken seriously, other states may be less prone to pitched public rhetorical and diplomatic struggles. Taking them seriously, however, means sometimes heeding criticism and making

meaningful policy modifications in response to the reactions of other states. Foreign leaders and diplomats will tire of speaking their minds if the advice they offer is regularly ignored. The opposite is also true: When another country goes forward with a policy after rejecting U.S. commentary, the United States cannot resort to rhetorical condemnation or financial punishment.

Finally, the United States government needs to continue to work on its public face. Public diplomacy has been much talked about since 9/11.¹⁰ The effort by U.S. officials to explain and contextualize U.S. actions and to clarify U.S. intent is crucial. True, pomp and circumstance cannot turn a hated policy into a beloved one. If U.S. policy is aggressive, sweet words will not change that fact. In the vast area of gray, however, in which state actions can be interpreted in a myriad of ways, official explanations offered in a variety of settings are important.

The United States is incredibly powerful as its response to 9/11 has clearly demonstrated. Even though balancing is hardly an option for lesser powers today, they can and do resist. Given continued friction and continued resistance, the real possibility of others states moving toward balancing should not be ignored.

STRONG VS. WEAK

Although the emphasis in this paper is on the specific case of the United States at the start of the twenty-first century, this work also speaks to a more general issue: Why do great powers not always get their way? Why does power not guarantee influence or leverage in all cases? In this final section, I note six different answers, most of which are suggested by the American case.

First, the weaker state may care more about the issue. Such explanations are often phrased in terms of willpower, morale, nationalism, commitment, or resolve.

Second, the weaker state may adopt a more effective policy and/or the stronger state may commit a tactical blunder. Strong states, for instance, may adopt policies that open the door to manipulation by weak states. Thus, former Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani noted in early 2004 that the United States is “stuck in the mud in Iraq, and they know that if Iran wanted to, it could make their problems even worse.”¹¹ Iran could not have created this vulnerability, but Tehran could exploit it once the United States committed itself to Iraq.

Third, the nature of certain issues, such as intelligence-gathering or global warming, may mean that even the most powerful must cooperate if they hope to solve the problem. To be clear, not all of these examples are the same. The weak and the strong state both may benefit from a clean environment, but the intelligence needed to meet a threat may only be a priority for the stronger state; the weaker state may be willing to withhold that intelligence, especially if it fears close cooperation could even have negative, rather than neutral, impact. A variant of this argument is that a strong state’s domestic audience may demand burden-sharing, thereby turning an issue on which the state could act on its own into one in which it must seek support from weaker states.

Fourth, a transparent political system opens the door to foreign lobbying by the weaker state. The impact of lobbying is related to the sixth idea below, the manipulation of the domestic norms of the great power by the lesser one.

Fifth, geography or technology—material factors—may give a weaker state an edge. As noted above, Turkey’s location meant it had leverage over the United States before the Iraq war

in 2003. Reliance on terrorism or non-conventional weapons may redress power disparities in traditional measures such as the size of a state's GDP or the number of military personnel.

Sixth, weak states may latch on to international or domestic norms. Great powers may be constrained by common rules and institutions such as Hedley Bull's international society. Weak states might also use the domestic norms of more powerful but liberal states against the more powerful state itself.¹² We may be witnessing a similar dynamic in Iraq where Shiite leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has embraced the idea of democratic elections knowing that Iraqi Shiites are a demographic majority. Some recent Palestinian calls for a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rest on the same combination of factors: democratic rules and an expected demographic majority. In both cases, the emphasis on democratic values is sure to appeal to the American public.

While this list is not meant to be exhaustive, it does capture a number of avenues by which the weak may challenge the strong. A great advantage in material power is not enough to get one's way in more cases than a superpower might like to admit.

¹ I would like to thank Robert Blecher, Waleed Hazbun, and Alex Lennon for comments on earlier drafts. The arguments and errors remain my own.

² Fareed Zakaria, "The Arrogant Empire," *Newsweek*, March 24, 2003.

³ Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "American primacy in perspective," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 2002.

⁴ Charles A. Kupchan, "Hollow Hegemony or Stable Multipolarity?" in G. John Ikenberry, *America Unrivaled* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 68-97. See also, Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002).

⁵ For a dissenting view, see Kupchan, *The End of the American Era*.

⁶ See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); or, more recently, Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," in Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled*, pp. 29-67.

⁷ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 179.

⁸ On U.S. self-restraint, see G. John Ikenberry, "Democracy, Institutions, and American Restraint," in Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled*, pp. 213-238. See also, Ikenberry, *After Victory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

⁹ See Ikenberry, "Democracy, Institutions, and American Restraint."

¹⁰ Alexander T.J. Lennon, editor, *The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). See also Neil Macfarquhar, "Washington's Arabic TV Effort Gets Mixed Reviews," *New York Times*, February 20, 2004, p. A3.

¹¹ David Ignatius, "What Iran Wants In Iraq," *Washington Post*, February 27, 2004, p. A23.

¹² For examples of this last possibility, see Kelly M. Greenhill, "People Pressure: Strategic Engineered Migration as an Instrument of Statecraft and the Rise of the Human Rights Regime," Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February 2004.