

What Accounts for Popular Support for Islamist Parties in the Arab World?
Evidence from the Arab Barometer

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Introduction

Since the defeat in the wars of 1967 and 1973, the Arab world has undergone a religious reawakening. The increased importance of religiosity has become more visible in daily life, manners of dress, and in patterns of speech. The Islamist movement also become an important actor throughout the region and one that now significantly influences the political sphere in many societies.

The existing literature has examined this rise of support for political Islam in the Arab world, generally showing it to be quite high throughout most societies. On average, the majority of individuals believe that an increased role for religion in public life would have positive benefits for society (Arab Barometer 2006/7). Considering this general support for political Islam, many observers have argued that the Islamist movement represents the most serious challenge to the existing political order throughout the region. Additionally, given that support for Islamist ideology appears to be high, it is often assumed that support for Islamist parties will be high, especially in light of the electoral outcomes of elections in Jordan in 1989, Algeria in 1991 and the West Bank and Gaza (WBG) in 2006. Yet, while sympathy for political Islam tends to be relatively high in most societies, generally speaking, relatively few Arab citizens consider themselves to be supporters of Islamist parties (Arab Barometer 2006/7).

This paper investigates what are the determinants of support for both political Islam and Islamist parties. It begins by examining reasons to support both political Islam and Islamist parties and then derives specific hypotheses to be tested empirically. Using data from five Arab societies from the 2006/7 Arab Barometer survey, it develops a model to statistically tests these hypotheses to better understand the causes which explain support for Islamist ideology compared to support for a an Islamist party.

Defining Political Islam

The concept of political Islam tends to be widely used but is often poorly defined. It originated to describe the new ideology which was espoused by Ayotollah Khomeini and his supporters during the Iranian revolution in 1979. Since that time it and the related term Islamist have been used to describe a wide range of ideologies and movements ranging from mainstream political parties such as the Justice and Development (AKP) in Turkey to terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda.

The majority of definitions of political Islam state that this concept is an ideology which states that Islam should inform social and political life. For some, such as Shepard (1996), this implies a strict adherence to the *shari'a*, or traditional Islamic law. Others take a more general approach arguing that political Islam is simply “the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life” (Berman 2003, p. 258). Similarly, Fuller (2003, xi) provides a definition arguing that adherents of political Islam believe that “Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world and implemented in some fashion.”

While these definitions focus on the nature of political Islam generally, Denoex (2002, 61) defines it by focusing the actions of its adherents. He states that political Islam is “a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imaging a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from Islamic tradition.” In line with these definitions, this

paper suggests the following definitions: political Islam is the belief the role of Islam within the political sphere should be increased and Islamist organizations are those that use Islam instrumentally to pursue political actions.

While it is possible to define political Islam, actually identifying Islamist movements proves quite challenging given the wide diversity in movements seen across the Islamic world (see Esposito 1999; Al-Azmeh 1993). As a result, scholars have attempted to differentiate between Islamist movements who strive for different goals. For example, Roy (1994) distinguishes between “traditionalist groups,” “fundamentalist groups,” and “Islamist groups” by examining their stated beliefs, the actions of their adherents, and their stated goals. Yet, this typology also does not fully differentiate which groups are Islamist from those which are not, but rather it primarily helps distinguish between types of Islamist groups.

Utvik (1993) provides a practical definition by noting three key characteristics of Islamist organizations. First, all Islamist groups refer to themselves as the “Islamist movement;” second, they all call for an Islamist state ruled in accordance with the *shari'a*; and third, they are organized in an attempt to achieve this goal. This approach is useful in that it places the primary definition on the group itself. If a group claims to be Islamist organization and acts accordingly, then it should be considered part of the Islamist movement.

While a useful approach, Utvik’s claim that all groups call for *shari'a* is overly stringent. Even when an Islamist group such as Hamas has taken control of a territory such as Gaza, full Islamic law had not been implemented. In fact, violence recently erupted when a minor Islamist group named Jund Ansar Allah challenged Hamas’

Islamic character for not implementing the full *shari'a* (NY Times 2009). As such, in categorizing Islamist organizations, this paper will use Utvik's approach with the following modification: all Islamist groups seek to increase the role of religion in the political sphere with the full implementation of the *shari'a* as a possible long-term goal.

Understanding Support for Political Islam

There are numerous reasons why ordinary citizens might support Islamist movements throughout the Arab world, most of which fall into one of five general explanations.¹ The first argues that Islam and politics are inherently intertwined in Muslim society more strongly than in other religious traditions. For example, Gellner (1981, 1) writes:

Islam is the blueprint of a social order. It holds that a set of rules exists, external and divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men, which defines the proper ordering of society... Thus there is in principle no call or justification for an internal separation of society into two parts, of which one would be closer to the deity than the other.

In a similar vein, Bernard Lewis (2003, 97) argues that political and religious power is unified in Muslim society. He states:

Among the Jews, for whose beliefs Josephus coined the term "theocracy," God was Caesar. For the Muslims, too, God was the supreme sovereign, and the caliph was his vice regent, "his shadow on earth."

Given the relationship between political and religious power within Islam, this school of thought implies that pious Muslims see no distinction between politics and religion.

Empirically speaking, this means that individuals who are more religious are more likely

¹ It should be noted that these three schools of thought are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, many scholars in the third school highlight the organizational capacities of Islamist groups as the mechanism by which Islamists became seen as the primary opposition to the regime.

to be supportive of political Islam given that the movement seeks to increase the role of religion in the political sphere. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1a: Individuals who have higher levels of personal piety are more likely to support political Islam.

In a second approach, some scholars argue that Islamists win support due to the strong network of social services which they have established. Clark (2004) details the numerous Islamic charities in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen which range from medical clinics and schools to women's associations and services for the poor. Clark notes how many citizens—not just the poor—make use of these services as their quality often exceeds that of those provided by the government. Similarly, Sullivan (1994) details how Islamic groups responded to the 1992 Cairo earthquake by providing important emergency relief to individual who received no aid from the government. Levitt (2006) makes a similar claim in regards to Hamas, which provides important services to Palestinians.

Thus, there is evidence to show that many cases Islamic charities provide similar to services to those provided by the government and often the quality of these services is often better and the reach more extended. In societies with little confidence in the government capacity, it is possible that ordinary citizens come to support political Islam because of its broad service provision. These societies help many people—especially the poor—leading individuals to be sympathetic towards the movement. This leads to hypothesis:

H2a: Individuals who receive benefits from the Islamist movement are more likely to support political Islam.

A third school in the literature argues that support for political Islam is largely strategic in the belief that the movement is the most capable of challenging the existing regime. These scholars highlight the increasing levels of resentment throughout the Arab world. For example, al-Suwaidi (1995) argues that Islamist groups will continue to grow “as long as Arab governments resist political participation and refuse to tolerate different political opinions” (92).

Based on findings from survey data, Tessler (1997) confirms that societal resentment is high and that most citizens have low levels of support for the regime. As such, he claims that individuals are more likely to support any credible opposition movement against the government for strategic reasons, even if they do not necessarily support their specific beliefs. Like Ajami (1992), Tessler argues that the failures of the political Left has resulted in Islamists being perceived as the only viable opposition movement, leading many members of society to demonstrate their dislike of the government by supporting political Islam. Thus, ordinary citizens are likely to support Islamists strategically due to resentment against the regime. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H3a: Individuals who are less supportive of the existing regime are more likely to support political Islam.

A fourth explanation places a greater emphasis on socio-economic factors in accounting for support for political Islam. Ayubi (1991) argues that base support for political Islam comes from urban, educated, and relatively young individuals who were politically involved but lacked a movement to support with the failure of post-independence populist regimes throughout the Arab world. As a politically mobilized

group with unfulfilled expectations, these individuals became the backbone of the newly formed Islamist movement. Similarly, Roy (1994) notes that among individuals who join radical Islamist groups, the majority comes from the “lumpen intelligentsia, meaning that they are well-educated individuals who cannot find positions in society that meet their expectations. While support for political Islam broadly defined is not the same as support for militant Islam, it is important to note that Roy also finds that this group tends to be attracted to forms of political Islam.

Yet, on the other hand, some have argued that political Islam is more likely to be supported by poorer and more marginalized individuals. Demir (2005) notes that poverty and exclusion have provided a fertile breeding ground for Islamist movements. In light of poor economic conditions, individuals are more likely to seek help from any group promising a better future. Given the slogans of the Islamist movement including “Islam is the solution” and “Justice and equality for all”, these individuals are more likely to be supportive of the movement. Moreover, the basic services provided to the poor are also likely to lead to broad support amongst this group. This leads to the following hypotheses:

H4a: Younger individuals are more likely to support political Islam.

H5a: More educated individuals are likely to support political Islam.

H6a: Less educated individuals are more likely to support political Islam.

A fifth explanation focuses on anti-Westernism to explain support for political Islam. For example, Burgat (1993) claims that political Islam seeks “cultural differentiation from the West and reconnection with the pre-colonial symbolic universe.” Ayubi (1991) also states that because of the upheavals brought upon by modernization,

much support from political Islam derives from it being a reactionary force which promotes a return to an earlier time when more traditional religious and cultural values were upheld. Given the focus of many Islamist organizations on a return to a more traditional way of life, many supporters of political Islam are likely to be more anti-Western. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H7a: Support for political Islam is a reaction against globalization and the destruction of traditional life.

Support for Islamist Parties

While support for political Islam is well documented throughout the literature, support for Islamist parties specifically has received less attention. In fact, there is often relatively little distinction between the two with Islamist parties being portrayed as just another element of the movement. Yet, a closer examination reveals potential differences between support for Islamist parties and support for the ideology more generally.

Most importantly, unlike support for political Islam generally which allows for multiple other sympathies, support for an Islamist party requires support for the party over all other competing parties or candidates. Thus, while an individual may sympathize with the aims of the Islamist movement and perhaps an Islamist party, this does not necessarily translate into a vote for the party. Many other considerations exist for voters including personal connections to a candidate, concerns about the consequences of voting for an opposition party, or believing other issues are more important than those raised by the Islamist party.

Second, given the oppositional status of Islamist parties, a person must accept some personal risk in supporting the opposition. In many authoritarian societies, ballots are not assured to be secret, meaning that an individual's support for the opposition may be discovered. Moreover, if too many people from an area vote for the opposition, punishment from the regime may result to discourage other areas from doing the same (Blaydes 2006). Thus, supporting the opposition put one's region at risk to receive fewer benefits from the state, which is often the major basis for electoral competition in the Arab world (Kilani and Sakijha 2002).

Thus, Islamists must present a compelling case to convince the voter to support them despite the fact that their expected chances of winning the election are relatively low. Moreover, even if the candidate or party does win, the ability to channel goods or *wasta*² to his or her constituents is limited (Patel 2006). Since individuals are allowed to cast but a single vote in most systems, Islamist parties must present themselves as the best (or least bad) option relative to other parties or candidates within the system while managing overcoming these potential obstacles.

Moreover, given that an Islamist party represents an opposition movement with low expectations of winning a majority, these parties face an additional challenge. In authoritarian regimes, it is possible to signal a protest vote by simply abstaining in order to signal that the election is a sham (Shi 1999). Thus, the party must convince voters that it is preferable to support its cause compared to simply abstaining. In recent years vote totals have fallen sharply and are often interpreted by observers and regimes as a form of protest against the regime. In Algeria, for example, vote totals have plummeted as voters,

² *Wasta*, literally meaning an intermediary or connection, is the use of connections to receive personal benefits. For a detailed discussion of *wasta*, see Kilani and Sakijha 2002.

realizing the opposition has no real chance at victory and frustrated with the existing regime, choose to boycott the election (Hachemaoui 2007). As such, not only must an Islamist party convince voters it is the best party, it must convince them that it is actually worth voting in an election.

Islamist parties have a variety of means in which to appeal to potential voters. Most basically, by defining themselves as Islamist, these parties signal to potential supporters that their primary function is to advocate an increased role for religion in public life. While Islamist parties may advocate many other positions, as they often do, their primary identity is that of being the party representing the banner of Islam. As such, in appealing to voters, Islamist parties have a significant advantage among individuals who are more supportive of a greater role for religion in public life. Meanwhile, it is less likely that these parties will win significant support from those who disagree with their original *raison d'être*. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H8: Individuals who are more supportive of political Islam are more likely to support an Islamist party.

Yet, this identity also presents a potential limitation, as the debate over the place of religion in politics is not the central feature of the political sphere in most Arab societies. In fact, few serious candidates or parties present themselves as being secular.³ Rather, most candidates take great strides to demonstrate their piety even if they are not associated with the Islamic movement.⁴ This implies that the Islamic movement may

³ In observing the 2007 parliamentary elections in Jordan, virtually all candidates highlighted their religiosity in their speeches and campaign material. Moreover, most ordinary citizens interviewed were confused by the distinction between “Islamist” and “non-Islamist” candidates. Even if not supporting a member of the Islamist IAF or an independent Islamist candidate, they noted that their candidate (and often all of the candidates) was good Muslim.

⁴ Even members of historically secular parties such as Fatah currently demonstrate their religiosity. Mahmoud Abbas is often shown on Palestinian TV attending Friday prayers to help limit claims by

struggle to win a high number of votes on this issue alone as virtually all candidates or parties present themselves as supporters of Islam and the *shari'a*. While the Islamist movement may present more legitimate claim based its past actions and slate of candidates, distinguishing itself based solely on its support for an increased role for religion in public life may yield limited benefits in this environment.

However, due to their support for political Islam, Islamist parties may win support for the same reasons that individuals support political Islam. In other words, the reasons for supporting political Islam could translate into voting for a candidate advocating these positions, meaning that support for the two would largely be for the same reasons. As such, the hypotheses which lead to support for political Islam could also explain support for an Islamist party, leading to the following hypotheses:

H1b: Individuals who have higher levels of personal piety are more likely to support political Islam.

H2b: Individuals who receive benefits from the Islamist movement are more likely to support political Islam.

H3b: Individuals who are less supportive of the existing regime are more likely to support Islamist parties.

H4b: Younger individuals are more likely to support Islamist parties.

H5b: More educated individuals are more likely to support Islamist parties

H6b: Less educated individuals are more likely to support Islamist parties

H7b: Support for Islamist parties is a reaction against globalization and the destruction of traditional life.

Hamis supporters that he and his party are secular.

In addition to these factors, there are other reasons why an individual might choose to vote for an Islamist party. First, by its association with religion, the party signals that it is likely to be less corrupt than most regimes in power (Zubaida 2005). Given the perception of men of religion as being uncorrupt, if an Islamist party came to power, it is implied that levels of corruption should decrease. There is also some historical evidence to suggest that this would in fact be the case. For example, when Islamist candidates won 40% of the seats in parliament in Jordan in the 1989 elections, these MPs undertook a campaign to root out corruption at all levels (Arabiyyat). This leads to the following hypothesis:

H8: Individuals support an Islamist party due to the perception it would be less corrupt than the existing regime.

Second, Islamist parties often take a hard line on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Abu Rumman 2007). Given the religious element of this conflict, it can be a rallying cry for Islamist parties seeking to increase the importance of potential supporters' religious identity by standing up for the Palestinian cause. By reducing the conflict to a battle of Muslims against Jews for sacred land, this conflict fits well into the natural rhetoric for Islamist parties. Moreover, given the great importance of this conflict throughout the Arab world (Telhami 2008), it is possible for Islamist parties to seek to win votes based on a more rejectionist position towards Israel. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H9: Individuals support an Islamist party due to its hard line on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Cases

The cases used to test these hypotheses will be Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. While there are some similarities between these cases the differences between them are numerous. Algeria was a French colony and upon independence the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the military dominated politics. The regime promoted socialist policies which, like many Arab states, led to stagnated economic growth during the 1980s (see World Bank 2004). In response to widespread frustration amongst the population, the regime undertook a rapid period of political liberalization including elections (Bouandel and Zoubir 1998). In the first round of elections in 1991, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) performed extremely well winning the majority of seats. The secular military regime, faced with the prospect of sharing power with an Islamist party, chose to cancel the second round of elections leading some member of the FIS as well as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) to take up arms to try to overthrow the existing regime to bring an Islamic state to Algeria. This resulted in a violent civil war that lasted throughout the 1990s (Entelis and Arone 1992).

The regime eventually defeated the Islamist insurgency and reinstated elections for parliament and the presidency. However, religious parties are now banned in an attempt to prevent a similar outcome to the 1991 elections. Despite this constitutional ban, some parties led by individuals who are known Islamists have often been allowed to participate in elections, although a mildly Islamist presidential candidate was not allowed to run in 2004 (see Robbins and Tessler 2007). Nevertheless, this restriction may limit the effectiveness of these parties who, though they have Islamist roots, are restricted in their actions relative Islamist parties in other cases.

Jordan provides a much different setting for Islamist parties. Unlike Algeria, Jordan is a monarchy where the king traces his lineage back to the prophet Mohammad. Thus, while the military has overseen the development of a largely secular regime in Algeria, in Jordan the monarch uses religion directly to help legitimize his rule (Sayigh 1991). Moreover, the relationship with the Islamist movement has varied greatly over time. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood was long a staunch supporter of the regime and numerous prominent members of the Brotherhood have served in ministerial posts (Boulby 1999).

Like Algeria, Jordan suffered economic stagnation during the 1980s leading to a period of rapid liberalization. In 1989, Jordan contested its first elections since 1967 which produced a strong showing by the Muslim Brotherhood and independent Islamist candidates. In fact, Islamist candidates won 40% of the seats in parliament. Islamist influence in parliament was pronounced and the Brotherhood candidates began to undertake numerous controversial actions including passing laws limiting male and female interaction in public (see Sahliyah 2005) as well as pursuing charges of corruption at the highest levels (Arabiyat). In part due to the breakdown in relations between the palace and the Brotherhood, a new electoral law was enacted which created a single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system (Lucas 2000). Under the old system, the palace believed that a citizen's first vote was for his or her tribe while the second and beyond would likely be cast for an Islamist candidate (Lust-Okar 2006). Interestingly, the newly formed Islamic Action Front (IAF)—which ran many of the same Brotherhood candidates that ran in 1989—received 16.1% of the overall vote compared to 15.6% in 1989 (Robbins 2009; Clark 2004, 88). However, the proportion of seats for Islamists in

parliament decreased dramatically as a result of the new apportionment system.

Including independent Islamists, the number of seats decreased from thirty-two (of which the IAF won sixteen) to twenty-two.

The IAF (and other parties) strongly condemned the so-called “*sawt wahid*” or single vote system. Additionally, the party was strongly opposed to Jordan’s 1994 peace treaty with Israel and as a result boycotted the 1997 election (Ryan 1998). Although it participated in the 2003 election winning sixteen seats (out of 110) with 14.5% of the overall vote, in the 2007 election the IAF won only six seats with 5.5% of the overall vote. Throughout this time, the IAF has served as the primary opposition group in the Jordanian political system and has remained the largest party despite its recent decline (Abu Rumman 2007).

The case of Morocco shares some important characteristics with both Jordan and Algeria. Similar to Jordan, Morocco is also a monarchy with a limited parliamentary system. The monarchy also uses religion, in part, to legitimize its rule due to the claim that the king is descended from the prophet Mohammed and his official title is “Commander of the Faithful” (Waterbury 1982). However, like Morocco, Algeria has a French colonial heritage. Additionally, it has had very low electoral turnout rates (37% in 2007) in recent years, which is relatively similar to those for parliamentary elections in Algeria (Storm 2008).

The primary Islamist party—the Justice and Development Party (PJD)—however, has some important differences from the other cases. First, unlike the other four cases, the party does not have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The party was originally called the Democratic and Constitutional Popular Party and was founded by

Abdelkrim al-Khatib who had strong ties to the monarchy (Sater 2003). While not highly popular, the movement gained strength when the government convinced some moderate members of a banned Islamist group, the Chabiba Islamia, to join the party. In 1998 the party changed its name to the PJD and became a greater force in the Moroccan political system.

The PJD first contested parliamentary elections in 1997, winning only nine seats. In the 2002 parliamentary election the PJD won forty-two of 325 seats in parliament, but was highly successful in the districts in which it did compete with nearly all of its candidates proving victorious (Willis 2004). In 2007, the PJD won forty-six seats, many fewer than analysts had expected and fewer than the nationalist Istiqlal party (despite winning a slightly larger overall vote share).

The PJD has considered itself to be an opposition party since 2002. During that time it has undertaken some important innovations. Unlike some other parties such as the IAF or the Brotherhood in Egypt, much of its debate is over policy positions as opposed to ideological debates about religious issues within the party (Hamzawy 2007). It has reached out to other opposition parties including those on the left in the hopes of building a consensus on the necessary reforms in Moroccan life. It also supported liberalizing the *mudawwana*, or Moroccan code regulating marriage and families in 2005, a change which more conservative Islamist forces opposed (Clark and Young 2008). In 2007, the party developed an electoral platform that was pragmatic and focused on social policies. Also of note, rather than calling for the application of the *sharia* as is the norm for Islamist parties, the PJD called simply for protecting Morocco's Islamic identity (Hamzawy 2007).

As a result of this strategy, the PJD has been challenged by more hard line Islamist movements with the most prominent being the Movement for Justice and Charity led by Sheikh Abdul Salam Yassin. Unlike the PJD, this movement rejects electoral participation, arguing that the monarchy is too corrupt to be a party and claiming that the PJD is subservient to the monarchy (Cavatorta 2009). Thus, the PJD has faced a serious challenge from more conservative Islamists.

The case of the West Bank and Gaza has important differences from the other cases, the most important being the Israeli occupation. Lacking independence, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has only been in partial control of the territory since 1994. Throughout its history, the most important player within the PA has been the PLO which is dominated by Fatah. Fatah was originally formed by a group of exiles seeking the liberation of historic Palestine from Israeli control. With Muslims and Christians in leadership, Fatah advocated a secular ideology to promote unity amongst Palestinians (Malki 2006).

Hamas's origins lie in Gaza in the 1970s. Originally formed as an offshoot of the Gazan Muslim Brotherhood by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, it undertook mainly social service provision and education (Tamimi 2007). At the beginning of the first *intifada* in 1987 it published its charter and entered the political sphere. Originally, support for Hamas was relatively modest according to evidence from opinion polls (see PCPSR 1993-2000), but its militant actions including numerous suicide bombings during the 1990s increased its prominence. Unlike Fatah, Hamas rejected the peace process with Israel calling for the complete destruction of the state of Israel.

With the collapse of the peace process in 2000 and the beginning of the second intifada, Hamas's popularity began to increase steadily as seen in figure 1. Some analysts suggested that its rejection of the peace process and uncorrupt image combined with the disunity of Fatah led it to eventual victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections (Lahloh 2007; Shikaki 2006), winning 44.5% of the overall vote, but a large majority of seats in parliament.

The final case, Yemen, has some important similarities to each of the previous four, but some important distinctions as well. Yemen was divided from the 1962 until 1990 between the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). Upon unification, the main parties of the two former republics—the General People's Congress (GPC) in the North and the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) in the South—formed a unified government with Ali Abdullah Saleh of the GPC serving as president and Ali Salim al-Baidh of the YSP serving as vice-president (Dresch 2000).

The first elections were held in 1993 with numerous parties beyond the main two competing. The GPC won 143 seats out of 301, forcing it to form a coalition (Mahdi et al. 2007). However, rather than continuing the partnership with the YSP, the GPC could partner with the Islamist Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah) which had won nearly as many seats (sixty-two) as the YSP (sixty-nine). This resulted in the leader of Islah, Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, the head of the Hashid Confederation of tribes, becoming the speaker of parliament. Largely closed out from power, the YSP and many southerners felt betrayed by the unification process and sought to secede from the union (Kostiner

1996). This decision resulted in a forty-four day civil war in 1994 where the Northern forces overran the South which maintained a unified Yememi state.

In 1997 the YSP decided to boycott the election, which helped lead to the GPC winning an outright majority in parliament (Schwedler 2006). Overall, the GPC picked up an absolute majority while Islah lost ten seats. While al-Ahmar continued to serve as the speaker, relations between Islah and the GPC generally deteriorated with Islah becoming a clear opposition party. In 2003 Islah ran in opposition to the GPC and was the only other party to receive a significant vote share other than the GPC.

While the YSP and other opposition parties have remained small relative to Islah, in 2006 Islah joined with them to form the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) (Browers 2007). This coalition includes parties ranging from Islamist to communist in the goal of uniting the opposition against the regime. Running a united candidate for president in September of 2006, the parties have continued their cooperation. Nevertheless, despite the party's move toward the opposition camp, relations between Saleh and al-Ahmar continued to be strong until al-Ahmar's death in late 2007, with al-Ahmar even supporting Saleh against his party's candidate in the 2006 election.

Since al-Ahmar's death, relations have continued to decline and disagreement over a new electoral law promoted by the GPC resulted in a threatened boycott by the JMP. While the law could have been passed without their consent, the GPC backed down and an agreement was reached to delay elections for a period of two years to allow time to reach a deal on a new election law.

Thus, these cases represent a broad range from throughout the Arab world. There are differences in regime type, history of political Islam, and relationship between

Islamist parties and the state. However, in each case the party is allowed to run in elections and the party serves as an important oppositional player in the political sphere.

Data and Methods

The data used to test these hypotheses are provided by attitude surveys carried out as part of the Arab Barometer in Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and the West Bank and Gaza in 2006 and in Yemen in 2007. These surveys involved face-to-face interviews with representative national samples of adults over the age of eighteen at the household level. In Algeria, the survey was conducted by a team of scholars from the University of Algiers; in Jordan the survey was conducted by a team from the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan; in Morocco, the survey was conducted by a team from Hassan II University in Mohammedia; in the West Bank and Gaza, a team from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah conducted the survey; and in Yemen, a local research firm based in Sana'a conducted the survey.

In each case, stratified random sampling was used to select blocks of twelve houses. From these blocks, ten houses were chosen at random. Within each house, the number of adults over the age of eighteen was ascertained and then one was selected at random to be interviewed. In the case that no one was present or the person was unwilling, one of the two remaining houses was chosen at random and the process repeated. Thus, the result is a random sample at the household level clustered by block.

In order to measure the first dependent variable, support for political Islam, a three item battery was used as follows:

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

- 1) Men of religion should not influence how people vote in elections.
- 2) It would be better for [country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office.
- 3) Men of religion should have influence over decisions of government.

These items were combined into a ten-point scale where ten represents strong support for political Islam and one represents low support for political Islam. The distribution of this variable for each country can be seen in table 1.

In order to measure support for an Islamist party, the following item was used:
Which of the listed political parties best represents you politically, socially and economically? (open ended)

Using the methodology previously discussed, the following parties were categorized as Islamist in each society:

Algeria: Islamic Resistance Movement; Movement for Society and Peace (Hamass); Movement for National Reform

Jordan: Islamic Action Front (IAF); Islamic Center Party

Morocco: Justice and Development Party (PJD)

West Bank and Gaza: Hamass; Islamic Jihad

Yemen: Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah); al-Haqq; Joint Meetings Party (JMP)⁵

The full distribution for this variable in each society can be seen in table 2.

Operationalizing personal religiosity to test H1 is extremely challenging within Arab societies. Unlike in some societies where religion is viewed as a personal choice, in most Arab societies it is viewed most commonly as an inherited identity. At the present time, few individuals indicate that they are non-religious, making direct questions of limited use. Moreover, religious practice may not accurately capture personal religiosity. While these limitations exist, this paper operationalizes personal religiosity using a

⁵ While the Joint Meetings Party includes both Islamist and non-Islamist parties, given the dominance of Islah within this coalition it was considered as an Islamist party for the purposes of analysis. However, only two respondents indicated that they supported the JMP compared to 104 who stated that they supported Islah, indicating that the primary identity remains with one's party choice within the JMP.

combination of these two approaches by creating a three-item index with each question weighted equally. The items are as follows:

- 1) How often do you read the Quran? (Everyday or almost everyday, several times a week, sometimes, rarely, I don't read it)
- 2) Do you pray? (yes, no)
- 3) In general, would you describe yourself as religious? (religious, not religious)

In order to test H2—that support for political Islam is due to service provision—it would be ideal to have a variable that asks about use of such services. However, lacking such an item, a proxy was developed using *wasta*. While not identical to service provision, *wasta* relies on connections or an intermediary to receive a good or service. While this could be from someone other than a religious leader, if service provision accounted for support than it would be expected that supporters of political Islam had greater access to *wasta* than other members of society. In order to determine if an individual has used *wasta*, the following item is used:

During the past five years, have you ever used *wasta* to achieve something personal, family related, or for a neighborhood problem? (yes, no)

In order to test H3—that support for Islamist parties is strategic—it is necessary to evaluate an individual's attitude toward the regime. It would be expected that supporters of political Islam or Islamist parties would be less likely to be supportive of the regime if H3 were true. The variable used to evaluate one's attitude toward the existing regime was as follows:

Using a ten-point scale, where one means very unsatisfied and ten means very satisfied, indicate how satisfied you are with the performance of the current [country] government. (1-10)

In order to test H4—that younger individuals are more likely to support political Islam and Islamist parties—a standard question on age was used. Similarly, to test H5

and H6—that individuals or higher or lower education would be more likely to support political Islam or Islamist parties—a standard question asking about level of education was employed.

In order to test H7—that anti-Western attitudes accounts for support for political Islam—the following item was used:

Do you agree with the following statement? Exposure to the culture of the US and other Western countries has a harmful effect on [country]. (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

In order to test H8—that the perception that Islamist parties were less likely to be corrupt led to support for these parties—the following item was used:

In your opinion, which of the following is the most important problem facing [country] today? (Economic situation, corruption, authoritarianism, ending the US occupation of Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, other)⁶

Individuals who said corruption were deemed to be more concerned about this factor while those who did not were deemed to be less concerned.

The variable used to test H9—that individuals who support a more hard line policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are more likely to support Islamist parties—was as follows:

Which of the following statements best expresses your opinion about the problem of Israel and Palestine?

- 1) The Arab world should accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East only when the Palestinians accept Israel's existence.
- 2) The Arab world should not accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish state in the Middle East

While this variable does not capture the full range of possibilities, it is indicative about the attitude toward the peace process. The second statement, indicating that the Arab

⁶ In the case of the West Bank and Gaza, the response options varied slightly. In this case, the options were as follows: Economic situation, corruption, authoritarianism, ending the security chaos, ending the occupation, and other.

world should never accept Israel's existence, provides a hard line option implying complete resistance. On the other hand, the first option implies that the Arab world should accept Israel under a set of conditions. While some individuals may believe that other conditions should also apply or be willing to accept Israel under weaker conditions, responses to this question should indicate which respondents are more or less accommodating in their stance toward the conflict.

Lastly, a number of control variables were added. In all cases, sex was included. Additionally, in the case of Jordan, country of origin is used as a control variable. In this case, respondents were asked their country of origin and responses were coded as Jordanian, Palestinian, or other. In the West Bank and Gaza, a control variable was used to differentiate between respondents in the West Bank and in Gaza.

In order to test these hypotheses, it is necessary to run multiple sets of analysis. First, it is necessary to establish the determinants of support for political Islam as a concept. In this case, it is possible to perform OLS regression analysis to determine which factors account for support for political Islam and how this varies by society.

In order to evaluate support for an Islamist party, it is necessary to perform logistic regression analysis given that support for an Islamist party is a dichotomous variable. However, this approach has an important limitation as supporters of Islamist parties must be examined relative to a comparison group, meaning that we can see only how supporters of Islamist parties are statistically distinct from another groups in society. In this case, choosing an appropriate comparison group is difficult.

In this case, there are two main possible choices. First, the comparison group could be to all other members of society who do not support an Islamist party. Assuming

that it is possible for anyone in society to support an Islamist party, this is the natural comparison. Nevertheless, this conflates numerous groups including voters and non-voters as well as partisans and non-partisans into a single group. Thus, it is possible that certain differences are obscured because the different characteristics of each of these groups become conflated.

Second, it would be possible to use other voters as a comparison group. This choice would assume that some individuals choose not to vote and are thus unlikely to support an Islamist party. The implication is that the real competition would be for those who are voting and are evaluating which candidate or party to support. As such, the decision to vote is assumed to be entirely separate from the decision of which party or candidate to support.

While possible, this approach is of limited use within an authoritarian setting. Since elections are not generally considered to be free and fair, an Islamist party must convince many ordinary citizens to support it rather than abstaining. Thus, a citizen who wishes to send a message demanding some type of reform must weigh whether or not to support an Islamist party, another party, or to simply refuse to vote at all. As such, for many potential Islamist supporters, the choice is not between parties, but also whether to vote or not to vote. As a result, the comparison group used in the analysis to follow is all members of society who did not support an Islamist party.

In order to evaluate if and how support for political Islam varies from support for political Islam, the results regression analysis testing the above hypotheses is presented in table 3. In three of the cases—Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen—it was possible to use robust standard errors to take into account that respondents were

clustered. In Algeria and Morocco, however, the datasets did not include such information, so non-robust standard errors are presented.

Findings

In the case of support for political Islam, there are some striking similarities between all five societies as shown in M1. First, in evaluating H1—that more religious individuals are more supportive of political Islam—there is strong support in each society. In all cases, individuals who are more religious are more likely to be supportive of political Islam at standard levels of significance.

Second, there is a strong support in favor of H7 as there is an anti-Western tendency among supporters of political Islam. In this case, individuals who are more anti-Western are more likely to be supportive of political Islam at standard levels of significance in all five societies. This finding reinforces that of Ayubi (1991) and others who have argued that political Islam is a reaction against the forces of modernization in each of these societies.

Third, there is no support for H2 which claims that support for an Islamist party is due to the provision of services by the Islamist movement. While, as noted above, the test is not ideal, the fact that individuals who are supportive of political Islam are no more or less likely to have used *wasta* than other members of society does cast some doubt on this hypothesis.

Fourth, there is some evidence in favor of the H6 which theorizes that individuals of a lower socio-economic status are more likely to support political Islam. In three of the five societies—Algeria, Morocco, and the West Bank and Gaza—individuals with

lower levels of education were more likely to be supportive of political Islam at standard levels of significance. Moreover, while the relationships did not reach standard levels in Jordan and Yemen, the sign on the coefficient is negative, providing some additional evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Importantly, this also casts doubt on Ayubi's (1991) claim that individuals who support political Islam tend to be the frustrated elites.

Fifth, in three of the five cases—Algeria, Jordan, and the West Bank and Gaza—there is support for H4 as individuals who are younger are more likely to be supportive of political Islam at standard levels of significance. Additionally, in Yemen the sign on the coefficient is negative although it is not significant. Somewhat surprisingly, in Morocco, older individuals are statistically more likely to be supporters of political Islam.

Sixth, in three of the five cases—Algeria, the West Bank and Gaza and Yemen—there is support for H3 which theorizes that support for political Islam is strategic in nature. In these cases, support for political Islam was correlated with lower ratings of the government at standard levels of significance. In Jordan and Morocco, the sign on the coefficient was also negative, although the findings were not close to be significant at the 0.1 level. As a result, there is moderate support for this hypothesis across this sample of societies.

In none of the five cases is sex a significant predictor of support for political Islam, although in four of the five cases the sign on the coefficient suggests that males are somewhat more likely than females to be supportive of political Islam.

In the case of Jordan, there is no statistical difference in support for political Islam between individuals of Jordanian origin and those of Palestinian origin, although the sign on the coefficient reveals that individuals of Jordanian origin tend to be more supportive

overall. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza, individuals from Gaza are shown to be more likely to support political Islam at standard levels of significance.

Interpreting the results for support for Islamist parties presents a greater challenge. Importantly, the nature of logistic regression does not allow for a direct comparison of the coefficient estimates with those from the regression used to analyze the determinants of support for political Islam. Given that the results are significant or insignificant relative to a comparison group, the significance of coefficients must be understood relative to this group.

Second, logits provide estimates for the relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable, but provide estimates of the standard error only when the other variables are held at their means or some other specified point. As such, to fully understand the relationship it is necessary to examine the values at which the relationship is significant and those where it is not and how that changes over different values. Nevertheless, as a shorthand approach, it can be useful to examine the significance of each variable when all others are held at their means.

In order to examine support for Islamist parties and to compare it to support for political Islam, two models of support for an Islamist party are presented. The first of these models (M2) takes the same variables as were used to predict support for political Islam in addition to the two other variables which were suggested by H8 and H9, to examine if the determinants of support are similar. It excludes the variable support for political Islam, however, to allow the results to be compared to a model using this as a DV. The second model (M3) presents the same model in addition to the variable for support for political Islam to eliminate omitted variable bias, given that this variable is

expected to explain support for an Islamist party as well. Both models present standardized coefficients and account for clustering in the case of Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza and Yemen using robust standard errors.

The results from M2 reveal some similarities to the results in M1. In the first case, like in M1, individuals who are more religious (H1) tend to be more likely to support an Islamist party at standard levels of significance in four of the five societies with the exception being Jordan. As such, it appears that personal piety and religious practice is a significant predictor of support for an Islamist party in most cases.

However, in M1, being more anti-Western (H7) was a significant predictor of support for political Islam in all five societies. Yet, in the case of support for an Islamist party, this variable is not significant in any of the five societies. In fact, the sign on the coefficient is not consistent, with only two societies (West Bank and Gaza and Morocco) maintaining a positive sign while the remaining three have a negative sign, implying that individuals who are less anti-Western are somewhat more likely to be supportive of Islamist parties.

Interestingly, there are some important differences in the relationship for the rating of the government between the two models. In M1, individuals who had lower levels of support for the regime (H3) were more likely to support political Islam in three societies (Algeria, WBG, and Yemen). In M2, this relationship is also significant at standard levels in three societies, but in this case it is significant in Jordan but not in Algeria. This means that in only two cases, WBG and Yemen, are both supporters of political Islam and supporters of Islamist parties both less supportive of the regime in power.

As for use of *wasta* (H2), in M1 this variable was insignificant in all five cases. However, in M2, it proves to be significant in Morocco and Yemen. In Morocco, it is significant and has a positive correlation with support for an Islamist party, indicating that individuals who are supportive of a party may receive some private benefits which partially accounts for this support. Yet, in the case of Yemen, this relationship is significant but the coefficient is negative, indicating that individuals who support the party are less likely to benefit from *wasta*. Given the high levels of corruption in Yemen, it may be that rather than receiving substantial benefits from religious organizations, supporters of Islam are those who, on average, lack access to channels of patronage that exist for other individuals from the regime or elsewhere.

In terms of socio-economic explanations regarding support (H5 and H6), there is also somewhat mixed evidence. While there was support for the claim that less educated individuals support political Islam in at least three of the five societies in M1, in M2 the relationship is only significant at standard levels in Jordan. However, in this case support for Islamist parties is actually shown to be among those who are more educated. Interestingly, in Morocco and Yemen, while the relationship is not statistically significant, the sign is also positive, implying that more educated individuals are likely to support the Islamist party. This finding offers clear evidence that supporters of Islamist parties are more likely to be elites whereas ordinary and lower class individuals are more likely to be supportive of the concept of political Islam generally.

While younger age (H4) was significant in three of the five cases (Algeria, Jordan, and WBG) in M1, for M2 it is only significant in two cases (Morocco and WBG). Interestingly, in Morocco in M1, support for political Islam was actually correlated with

older age at standard levels of significance, implying that the party draws from a different demographic than general support for political Islam.

Sex was significant in three cases in M2. In Morocco and Yemen, men were more likely to be supporters of Islamist parties at standard levels. Yet, in WBG, women were more likely to be supportive of Hamas. Also of note, being of Palestinian origin in Jordan was not significant at standard levels and living in Gaza for WBG was also not significant.

In terms of the added variables which could account for support for an Islamist party, concern about corruption (H8) is only significant at standard levels in Yemen. While the sign on the coefficient is positive in the remaining cases except for Algeria, only in Yemen, probably the most corrupt of these societies, is the correlation significant. Given the focus on corruption by many of the parties and numerous analysts in explaining support for Islamist parties, this outcome is somewhat surprising.

As for taking a harder line toward Israel (H9), this variable is significant at standard levels in WBG and Yemen. Given the focus on this issue in WBG, it is unsurprising that this finding is significant. It is surprising that this factor was not significant in Jordan given the proximity of Jordan to the conflict, the high number of Palestinians living in Jordan, and the IAF's heavy focus on the conflict. This finding is even more surprising due to the fact that this variable was significant in Yemen where these factors are not present. However, it is possible that Islah has been able to use this conflict to win sympathy given the general sympathy for Palestinians among Arab publics.

Comparing the results from M2 to those of M3 reveals a high degree of consistency. First, as expected, support for the concept of political Islam is a significant predictor of support for an Islamist party in all five societies. Yet, the remainder of the model undergoes relatively little change in terms of tests of significance. In fact, only two items across all five cases change in their significance. First, younger age is no longer significant at the 0.1 level in WBG. Second, being anti-Western in orientation becomes significant at the 0.1 level in the case of Yemen. Meanwhile, the remaining items all remain significant at least at the 0.1 level.

The consistency of these results has a number of important implications. First, it implies that the overall findings are robust given that they are virtually the same for two different models. As such, confidence in the findings is significantly increased.

Second, these findings demonstrate that although support for political Islam is an important predictor of support for an Islamist party, other factors also matter even when support for political Islam is taken into account.

Implications and Conclusion

Looking at the findings within each country, four implications become clear. First, support for political Islam is relatively similar between all five societies. While there is some variation between societies, it appears that in most cases individuals who are more religious and more anti-Western are supportive of political Islam. These findings lend some credibility to the claim made by Bernard Lewis and others that for pious Muslims the political and religious spheres are seen to be one. Moreover, the claims made by Ayubi that the rise of political Islam is a reactive force against modern

developments and outside forces also seem supported. However, there is less support for his claim that the movement is supported by local elites as individuals who are less well educated and tend to be supporters of this concept more generally. However, there is support that younger individuals, who may be frustrated by poor economic outcomes, turn to political Islam.

Second, there are significant differences between support for political Islam and support for an Islamist party. In fact, within each society, only individuals who are more religious are more likely to be supportive of political Islam and supportive of Islamist parties, but even this relationship does not hold in all five with Jordan being the exception. However, the only other instance of a variable being a significant predictor of support for political Islam and support for an Islamist party (in all models) within the same country is rating of the regime in both the West Bank and Gaza and Yemen. This finding provides clear evidence suggesting that sympathy or support for political Islam generally does not inherently translate into support for an Islamist party.

Third, there appears to be baseline support for parties based on their religious identities. In all five societies, the general belief that Islam should play a greater role in politics engendered support for Islamist parties. Combined with the fact that in most societies personal religiosity is also a significant predictor, Islamist parties appear to be able to win a base level of support based on these factors. While the nature of the logit limits the ability to compare the coefficients between societies, it is possible to compare the coefficients within each case given that they are standardized. In each case the size of these coefficients—which represent the increase in likelihood of a person supporting an Islamist party based on a change from the lowest to the highest value for the independent

variable—imply that these variables account for a high level of explained variation in each society. As such, these signals sent by the party to potential supporters represent an important element in the party establishing itself within each political system.

Fourth, the overall success of the party appears to be correlated with the nature of support for the party. In the case of Jordan, the least successful of the five parties at present, the IAF wins support amongst those supportive of political Islam and those elites who are opposed to the government. However, when compared to supporters of political Islam more generally, it is clear that this demographic is not their real target population. Overall, less well-educated individuals tend to be supportive of political Islam, meaning that the party is not capturing those who should be among its base. Moreover, the Jordanian government is relatively popular compared to other regimes throughout the region (*Arab Barometer 2006/7*), meaning that winning strongly among those opposed to the regime is unlikely to result in great success.

In Algeria and Morocco, parties have had moderate levels of success. While stated support is much lower in Algeria than support in the election, this may be due in part to the fact that there are three main Islamist parties as well as the fear of admitting support for one given their ambiguous legal status. While there may be some form of a protest vote, there is no significant predictor of support for the parties save support for political Islam and personal religiosity. As such, it appears that the parties are unable to distinguish themselves on any issue. Some of this may have to do with competition between the parties themselves, but in either case it is unlikely that any of the parties will grow substantially by attracting supporters solely on the platform of promoting an increased role for religion in the public sphere.

In Morocco, in addition to supporters of political Islam, the PJD appears to mainly attract young men who receive some form of material benefit. Additionally, individuals with higher education is nearly positively significant at standard levels in M2. In other words, it appears that the party attracts young elites. Given that general support for political Islam is concentrated among the older and less well educated individuals, the party wins support from a group which is distinct from its primary group of sympathizers. Moreover, the party lacks a single issue or strategic support in opposition to the government, making it unlikely to succeed without major changes.

In Yemen, Islah has been more successful, winning over 20% support in every election since its creation. While unlikely to win an election, the party has established itself as a significant player and was even able to force the regime to delay an election to prevent it from being run under a new election law.⁷ A closer examination of its support reveals that it is generally in line with the constituency which is more sympathetic to political Islam generally. First, while it has the same base of support from its ideology, it also wins support from voters who are strongly opposed to the existing regime. Additionally, it picks up support from those more concerned about corruption and individuals who take a harder line on the peace process. It is also the only party to win support at a statistically significant level from those who are more anti-Western, which is an important predictor of support for political Islam generally. Additionally, age and education are not significant predictors, suggesting that the party wins support more or less equally across demographics. Finally, while men are more likely than women to support the party, given much higher rate of voting for men than women in Yemen, this is not particularly surprising. However, as can be seen, supporters of Islah are less likely to

⁷ Islah, as the main party of the JMP, was primarily responsible for this change.


have used *wasta*, suggesting that they may not have access to the same patronage networks as supporters of other parties. Given the importance of patronage in the Yemeni political system, this may help account for their inability to win more support over time.

In the final case, the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas has been highly successful and even won a majority in parliamentary elections in 2006. In this case, Hamas won support not only from its base of supporters for political Islam, but also on two main issues: frustration with the existing regime and support for its position taking a harder line on the peace process. While corruption and anti-Westernism were not significant, given the predominance of the peace process within the Palestinian political sphere (Arab Barometer 2006/7), Hamas' ability to present an alternative to Fatah's position helped win support. Importantly, like for Islah, demographic variables were not significant predictors of support, suggesting Hamas can win support across the political spectrum. Unlike Yemen, however, use of *wasta* was insignificant, although the sign on the coefficient was positive, suggesting that Hamas' network may help win some support. The fact that women were more likely than men to support Hamas holding all else is also unique among these cases, which also suggests that Hamas has been able to carry its message to a group that is less likely to support the party in the other societies.

Taken together, these results imply that in cases where Islamist parties win support based on a political issue such as corruption or position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in addition to sympathy for their support for political Islam, they are more likely to be successful. Additionally, in Morocco and Jordan, support for the party tends to come from more educated individuals, which is not the group most attracted to political

Islam generally. In cases where the party has been more successful, such as Yemen and the West Bank and Gaza, the predictors of support for political Islam and the party tend to be more similar. Given that support for political Islam is relatively similar across all of these societies, this finding suggests that these two parties have been better able to reach out to sympathizers of political Islam and build a party that is in line with their natural base constituency. In the other three cases, support tends to come from other groups, implying that the parties have not been able to translate their inherent advantages into votes for the party. Future success for these parties will depend on the ability to bring support for the party more in line with support for the movement.

Figure 1



Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (www.pcpsr.org)

Table 1: Distribution of Support for Political Islam*

	Algeria	Jordan	Morocco	West Bank and Gaza	Yemen
1	6.9%	2.7%	2.3%	6.2%	3.0%
2	2.3%	5.6%	1.5%	2.1%	3.7%
3	6.7%	8.1%	6.6%	6.2%	11.6%
4	16.0%	21.1%	15.0%	16.4%	15.6%
5	17.4%	25.2%	17.6%	13.6%	25.1%
6	19.6%	22.3%	25.0%	15.8%	20.1%
7	18.5%	10.6%	19.3%	20.6%	12.3%
8	6.6%	2.4%	5.9%	7.0%	4.0%
9	3.8%	0.6%	3.1%	5.0%	2.3%
10	2.5%	1.4%	3.8%	7.2%	2.3%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*1 represents the lowest level of support for political Islam and 10 represents the highest

Table 2: Distribution of Support for Islamist Parties

	Algeria	Jordan	Morocco	West Bank and Gaza	Yemen
Yes	66	16	121	500	106
No	1,152	1,129	1,156	621	1,068
Total	1,218	1,145	1,277	1,121	1,174

Table 2

Algeria

OLS Regression with Support for Political Islam as the Dependent Variable and Logistic Regression with Support for Islamist Party as the Dependent Variable for Algeria			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Political Islam (M1)</i>	<i>Party (M2)</i>	<i>Party(M3)</i>
Higher Support for Pol Islam			2.112 (1.141)*
More Religious	0.173 (0.037)***	2.609 (1.264)**	2.232 (1.252)*
More Anti-Corruption		-0.267 (0.445)	-0.279 (0.454)
Higher Rating of Govt	-0.118 (0.035)***	-1.251 (0.855)	-0.688 (0.925)
Harder Line on Israel		0.791 (0.766)	0.740 (0.773)
More Anti-Western	0.144 (0.028)***	-0.564 (0.690)	-0.507 (0.726)
Has Used Wasta	-0.024 (0.019)	0.331 (0.423)	0.239 (0.440)
More Educated	-0.270 (0.045)***	-0.577 (1.055)	-0.447 (1.083)
Older	-0.261 (0.060)***	-0.485 (1.340)	-0.342 (1.463)
Female	-0.027 (0.20)	-0.174 (0.455)	-0.207 (0.479)
Constant	0.540 (0.049)***	-4.551 (1.562)***	-5.476 (1.693)***

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

Jordan

OLS Regression with Support for Political Islam as the Dependent Variable and Logistic
Regression with Support for Islamist Party as the Dependent Variable for Jordan

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Political Islam (M1)</i>	<i>Party (M2)</i>	<i>Party (M3)</i>
Higher Support for Poli Islam			3.500 (1.103)***
More Religious	0.076 (0.026)***	0.833 (1.071)	1.174 (1.221)
Higher Rating of Govt	-0.007 (0.026)	-2.729 (0.996)***	-2.433 (1.196)***
Harder Line on Israel		0.510 (0.764)	1.138 (1.013)
More Anti-Western	0.055 (0.020)***	-0.377 (0.826)	0.034 (0.895)
Has Used <i>Wasta</i>	-0.011 (0.012)	0.669 (0.551)	0.268 (0.644)
More Educated	-0.049 (0.034)	3.139 (1.204)***	4.430 (1.459)***
Older	-0.113 (0.042)***	1.506 (2.057)	0.396 (2.096)
Female	0.026 (0.14)	-0.468 (0.685)	-0.382 (0.715)
Palestinian	-0.023 (0.014)	0.289 (0.625)	0.387 (0.715)
Constant	0.516 (0.033)***	-5.428 (1.362)***	-9.170 (1.517)***

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. ***

Statistically significant at .01 level.

Morocco

OLS Regression with Support for Political Islam as the Dependent Variable and Logistic
Regression with Support for Islamist Party as the Dependent Variable for Morocco

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Political Islam (M1)</i>	<i>Party(M2)</i>	<i>Party (M3)</i>
Higher Support for Pol Islam			1.032 (0.600)*
More Religious	0.417 (0.029)***	1.360 (0.540)**	1.205 (0.545)**
More Anti-Corruption		0.018 (0.253)	0.040 (0.256)
Higher Rating of Govt	-0.011 (0.022)	-0.093 (0.388)	-0.100 (0.393)
Harder Line on Israel		-0.187 (0.249)	-0.253 (0.253)
More Anti-Western	0.124 (0.022)***	0.169 (0.389)	-0.042 (0.402)
Has Used Wasta	-0.006 (0.014)	0.492 (0.236)**	0.520 (0.238)**
More Educated	-0.173 (0.034)***	0.466 (0.514)	0.667 (0.530)
Older	0.061 (0.031)**	-1.173 (0.584)**	-1.161 (1.463)**
Female	-0.007 (0.14)	-0.660 (0.243)***	-0.661 (0.247)***
Constant	0.455 (0.030)***	-2.855 (0.569)***	-3.144 (0.622)***

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses.
*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. *** Statistically significant at .01 level.

West Bank and Gaza

OLS Regression with Support for Political Islam as the Dependent Variable and Logistic
Regression with Support for Islamist Party as the Dependent Variable for WBG

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Political Islam (M1)</i>	<i>Party (M2)</i>	<i>Party(M3)</i>
Higher Support for Poli Islam			2.097 (0.427)***
More Religious	0.216 (0.032)***	1.270 (0.401)***	0.727 (0.413)*
More Anti-Corruption		0.322 (0.255)	0.300 (0.260)
Higher Rating of Govt	-0.182 (0.19)***	-3.148 (0.268)***	-2.963 (0.278)***
Harder Line on Israel		0.451 (0.217)**	0.442 (0.223)**
More Anti-Western	0.056 (0.028)**	0.024 (0.302)	-0.127 (0.319)
Has Used Wasta	0.011 (0.020)	0.030 (0.245)	0.084 (0.258)
More Educated	-0.310 (0.044)***	-0.167 (0.472)	-0.038 (0.483)
Older	-0.092 (0.044)**	-0.794 (0.423)*	-0.328 (0.456)
Female	0.008 (0.19)	0.369 (0.147)**	0.399 (0.154)***
Gazan	0.050 (0.018)***	0.221 (0.211)	0.077 (0.228)
Constant	0.300 (0.036)***	-3.359 (0.510)***	-4.000 (0.572)***

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. ***

Statistically significant at .01 level.

Yemen

OLS Regression with Support for Political Islam as the Dependent Variable and Logistic Regression with Support for Islamist Party as the Dependent Variable for Yemen			
<i>Variable</i>	<i>Political Islam (M1)</i>	<i>Party (M2)</i>	<i>Party (M3)</i>
Higher Support for Pol Islam			3.809 (0.514)***
More Religious	0.203 (0.050)***	4.175 (1.196)***	3.097 (1.062)***
More Anti-Corruption		0.744 (0.257)***	0.452 (0.271)*
Higher Rating of Govt	-0.108 (0.031)***	-2.090 (0.567)***	-1.546 (0.575)***
Harder Line on Israel		2.863 (1.013)***	2.118 (1.030)**
More Anti-Western	0.087 (0.027)***	-0.348 (0.388)	-0.911 (0.470)*
Has Used Wasta	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.578 (0.249)**	-0.572 (0.255)**
More Educated	-0.047 (0.066)	0.755 (0.912)	0.116 (0.941)
Older	-0.026 (0.095)	0.229 (1.232)	0.707 (1.447)
Female	-0.015 (0.024)	-0.772 (0.378)**	-0.818 (0.395)**
Constant	0.369 (0.068)***	-7.825 (1.478)***	-7.898 (1.298)***

Note: Table presents coefficient (β) estimates with standard errors in parentheses.

*Statistically significant at .1 level. **Statistically significant at .05 level. ***

Statistically significant at .01 level.

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