AFGHANISTAN WAR, RECONSTRUCTION
AP Photo
Fall 2008
"Afghanistan: Partners in Time"
Journal Article, World Policy Journal, 25th Anniversary Edition, issue 3, volume 25
By Charles G. Cogan, Associate, International Security Program
"If the Pakistani authorities cannot or will not play their part, a way should be found to scale back significantly the U.S. and NATO military commitment in Afghanistan. Our fundamental problem, it should be emphasized, is with Al Qaeda, and secondarily with the Taliban, who sheltered Al Qaeda. We cannot be perceived as moving toward a colonial war, as happened in Vietnam...."
Aviva Krauthammer
Winter 2008-09
"Assaf Moghadam Explores Global Jihad Movement and Increase in Suicide Attacks"
Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter
Assaf Moghadam, research fellow with the Belfer Center’s International Security Program/Initiative on Religion in International Affairs and an assistant professor and senior associate at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, has for nearly a decade examined the rise and spread of suicide attacks. He recently published The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks.
October 13, 2008
"The Simplistic Allure of Militarism"
Op-Ed, Agence Global
By Rami Khouri, Senior Fellow, The Dubai Initiative
Among the problems the senior American military and intelligence leaders acknowledge these days in Afghanistan are a robust and expanding heroin trade, the limited impact of the central government in Kabul, a steady stream of militants from next door Pakistan where they enjoy safe havens and popular support, and a weak economy.
AP Photo
August 13, 2008
"Solving FATA"
Op-Ed, The National Interest
By Hassan Abbas, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
"The growing Taliban insurgency in the Afghan-Pakistan border area increasingly threatens the geography of the region. Continuation of this crisis could derail the India-Pakistan peace process, undermine democratic gains in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan, and jeopardize U.S. interests in the region.
Despite the explosive nature of the crisis and apparent consensus between the Democratic and Republican presidential nominees about the need for additional focus on the area—as well as military forces there—the popular analysis of the situation often fails to appreciate the very basic facts of the issue...."
August 5, 2008
"Stephen M. Walt on the U.S., Iran, and the New Balance of Power in the Persian Gulf"
Q&A
By Stephen M. Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs; Faculty Chair, International Security Program and Kayhan Barzegar, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
Walt: “…..by maintaining a (new) balance you don’t get conflict breaking out and you tilt in favour whichever side seems to be falling behind. At the same time, you do try to discourage conflict whenever possible. You certainly don’t try to control the region yourselves and if the balance breaks down as it did in 1991 and you have to intervene you go in, you get out as quickly as possible. But you don’t try to organize these societies. You don’t try to tell them how to live. You don’t try to tell them how their governments should be organized and you don’t try to transform them at the point of a rifle barrel. This is not disengagement, but it is also not trying to control the region or dictate its political evolution.”
“…we are not going to have a stable long-term situation in the Persian Gulf until the United States and other countries in the region—including Iran—do come to some understanding about the various issues that concern them. Achieving that goal will require genuine diplomacy…The United States will also have to recognize that Iran’s size, potential power, large population, and its geo-strategic location inevitably make it a major player in the security environment in the Persian Gulf, and ignoring that fact is unrealistic…”
AP Photo
July-September 2008
"When Does the Mission Determine the Coalition? The Logic of Multilateral Intervention and the Case of Afghanistan"
Journal Article, Security Studies, issue 3, volume 17
By Sarah Kreps, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 2007-2008
"Using the debate between the logic of appropriateness and consequences as a theoretical backdrop, I argue that neither is able to explain the United States' choices between unilateralism and multilateralism in post-Cold War military interventions....In this article, I suggest that "consequences" are best specified according to time horizon, which creates intertemporal tradeoffs between the long-term benefits of multilateralism and immediate payoffs of unilateralism, and the nature of the intervention, which affects the operational payoffs of multilateralism. I test this argument and the existing explanations against the case of Afghanistan. Its within-case variation — largely unilateral in combat operations and robustly multilateral in post-conflict phases — lends strong support to the logic of consequences as specified according to time horizon and operational payoff."
AP Photo
Spring 2008
"No Sign until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 32
By Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason
The portion of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area dominated by Pashtun tribes poses the greatest challenge to U.S. national security interests. Here, extremist groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaida continue to enjoy safe haven. The Pashtun, whose tribal structures have been subverted since the 1970s, represent a unique cultural challenge that the U.S. foreign policy establishment has failed to appreciate. To reverse the trend of radicalization in this area, the United States and the Afghan government must strengthen and rebuild the Pashtuns’ tribal structures while reducing the external pressures on them. Maintaining the current policy of extending the central government into this region will only foment insurgency among a proto-insurgent people.
AP Photo
Spring 2008
"The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 4, volume 32
In 2001 U.S. and Afghan forces overthrew the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Less than a year later, insurgents began a sustained effort to bring down the government of Hamid Karzai. Fueling this insurgency was the collapse of governance following the ouster of the Taliban. To counter the insurgents, the government must extend governance into Afghanistan’s rural areas and establish effective law and order. Also needed is greater cooperation by the Pakistani government to capture or kill jihadists and undermine their ideological support.
soldiersmediacenter, Flickr Commons
March 2008
Saving Afghanistan
Policy Brief
By General (ret.) James L. Jones, USMC, Senior Advisor, Preventive Defense Project and Kristin Krohn Devold
This issue brief warns that without urgent policy changes U.S. and international efforts may fail in Afghanistan. The brief addresses the current situation in Afghanistan and offers several policy recommendations to ensure future success there.
February 2008
La République de Dieu
Book
By Charles G. Cogan, Associate, International Security Program
La République de Dieu is a collection of essays on the idea of God; on evangelism ("La République de Dieu"); on Islamic fundamentalism ("L'Islam médiéval"); and followed by empirical chapters analyzing a number of conflicts between the Muslim and non-Muslim world: Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Arab/Israeli.
