PREVENTIVE DEFENSE STRATEGY
Martha Stewart
October 30, 2008
Brent Scowcroft Addresses International Issues Facing the Next President
News
Former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft called on the next president to engage in civilized dialogue on foreign policy during a Forum address Wednesday evening (Oct. 29) at Harvard Kennedy School.
Liz Lynch
Winter 2008-09
"Belfer Center Alums Launch Center for New American Strategy (CNAS)"
Newsletter Article, Belfer Center Newsletter
Kurt Campbell and Michèle Flournoy, both alums of the Belfer Center, founded The Center for a New American Strategy in February 2007. The organization has grown into an intellectual, nonpartisan national think tank focusing on national security and defense.
Fall 2008
"Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 2, volume 33
By Norrin M. Ripsman and Jack S. Levy
British appeasement was primarily a strategy of buying time for rearmament against Germany. British leaders understood the Nazi menace and did not expect that appeasement would avoid an eventual war with Germany. They believed that by the time of the Rhineland crisis of 1936 the balance of power had already shifted in Germany’sfavor, but that British rearmament would work to reverse the balance by the end of the decade. Appeasement was a strategy to delay an expected confrontation with Germany until the military balance was more favorable.
August 22, 2008
Memo to President-elect McBama
Memorandum, Aspen Strategy Group
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
Graham Allison writes in a memo to a fictional President-elect McBama on the suject of nuclear terrorism, "You pledged that you would make preventing this catastrophe an organizing principle of your administration. This memo provides a brief outline of strategy and organization to fulfill that promise."
August 14, 2008
"Strengthening our Strategy Against WMD"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities and The Honorable Robert G. Joseph, Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy
Dr. Ashton B. Carter and Ambassador Robert G. Joseph discuss recommendations stemming from recommendations in final report of the review they co-chaired of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and other DOD efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction.
August 5, 2008
Defense Strategy & Budget in the Post-Bush Era
Paper
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities
A key challenge for the next administration's national security leadership concerns the management of investment in the U.S. national security future. In this paper for the Aspen Strategy Group, Dr. Ashton Carter discusses the challenges of defense budgeting and program selection, and the current mismatch between resources and strategy.
Summer 2008
"How American Treaty Behavior Threatens National Security"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
In recent years, American treaty behavior has produced growing concern among both allies and less friendly nations. On such fundamental issues as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, human rights, civil liberties, environmental disasters, and commerce, the United States has generated confusion and anger abroad. Such a climate is not conducive to needed cooperation in the conduct of foreign and security policy. Among U.S. actions that have caused concern are the failure to ratify several treaties; the attachment of reservations, understandings, and declarations before ratification; the failure to support a treaty regime once ratified; and treaty withdrawal. The structural and historical reasons for American treaty behavior are deeply rooted in the United States' system of government and do not merely reflect superpower arrogance.
Summer 2008
"The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
By Pavel Podvig
The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accu¬racy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.
Photo Credit: Deborah Gordon
July 1, 2008
PDP Co-Directors Lead U.S. Delegation to Taiwan & PRC for Strategic Security Discussions
Press Release
In cooperation with the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, PDP Co-Directors William Perry and Ashton Carter led a bipartisan civilian/military delegation to Taiwan and the People's Republic of China for the ninth Track II Strategic Security Issues Dialogue.
June 22 - July 1, 2008
Report of the Strategic Security Issues Delegation to Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC)
Report
By Dr. William J. Perry, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Admiral (ret.) Joseph W. Prueher, Senior Advisor, Preventive Defense Project, Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities, Stephen A. Orlins, President, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Dr. David M. Lampton, Director, China Studies, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Kurt M. Campbell, Former Associate Professor of Public Policy and International Relations, 1988-1993, Harvard Kennedy School; Former Assistant Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 1988-1993; and Former Research Fellow, ISP, 1985-1987, Dr. Ashley Tellis, Dr. Evan Medeiros, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation and Jan Berris, Vice-President, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations
Full text of the trip report from PDP's Track II meetings in Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
