WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
AP Photo
November 2008
"The United States, Israel, and Iran: Defusing an 'Existential' Threat"
Magazine or Newspaper Article, Arms Control Today
By Chuck Freilich, Senior Fellow, International Security Program
"Iran is an existential threat to Israel. This apocalyptic warning call has become a mantra continually repeated by virtually all Israeli leaders and defense officials and has been adopted by much of the U.S. national security establishment. President George W. Bush even warned that Iran’s declared intention of destroying Israel could lead to World War III.
There is no doubt that Iran poses a severe threat to Israel, not only in the nuclear field, but what kind of danger does its nuclear program constitute? Is Israel’s future in imminent danger if Iran goes nuclear? The answer is probably not. Although somewhat reassuring, this response is less than satisfying...."
AP Photo
September 2008
"Exporting Mass Destruction? The Determinants of Dual-Use Trade"
Journal Article, Journal of Peace Research, issue 5, volume 45
By Matthew Fuhrmann, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program
This study applies well-known arguments on the effect of conflict, alliances, and democracy on international trade to identify the determinants of dual-use trade. Dual-use commodities are those that can be used in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs or in legitimate civilian applications. This article advances a theory suggesting that governments seeking to maximize the gains from dual-use trade will promote exports to countries where there are security guarantees and restrict exports to countries where security threats exist.
August 22, 2008
Memo to President-elect McBama
Memorandum, Aspen Strategy Group
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
Graham Allison writes in a memo to a fictional President-elect McBama on the suject of nuclear terrorism, "You pledged that you would make preventing this catastrophe an organizing principle of your administration. This memo provides a brief outline of strategy and organization to fulfill that promise."
AP Photo
August 18, 2008
"Musharraf Exit May Affect U.S. Plans"
Media Feature
By Xenia Dormandy, Senior Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Xenia Dormandy, Director of the Project on India and the Subcontinent, was interviewed for National Public Radio's All Things Considered on the impact of Musharraf's resignation for U.S. foreign policy.
August 14, 2008
"Strengthening our Strategy Against WMD"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities and The Honorable Robert G. Joseph, Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy
Dr. Ashton B. Carter and Ambassador Robert G. Joseph discuss recommendations stemming from recommendations in final report of the review they co-chaired of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and other DOD efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction.
AP Photo
August 9, 2008
"Chinese, Russian Stall Tactics on Iran"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Joshua Gleis, Associate, International Security Program
"...The Chinese and Russians say they do not support stronger sanctions because they don't believe in their effectiveness. Off the record, however, both countries recognize that any form of sanctions that restrict their own business ventures is not going to stop the Iranians from pursuing their end goal of acquiring nuclear weapons.Thus in the meantime, the Russians and Chinese are angling themselves to maximize the economic benefits of such a precarious state of affairs in the Middle East...."
July 2008
"Denuclearization of the DPRK—A Role for the United Nations?"
Paper, volume 3
By Xiaohui (Anne) Wu, Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"The denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to be a source of considerable international concern. Yet, no coherent international framework has emerged to deal with this challenge in parallel with the regional mechanism of the six-party talks. With the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference set for 2010, appropriately addressing the DPRK nuclear issue is being identified as essential to maintaining the strength of the NPT. Can the United Nations (UN) afford to take a back seat in attempts at resolution?This article examines the potential of, and prospects for, an active UN role in facilitating Pyongyang's denuclearization process. Anne Wu's paper examines the potential of, and prospects for, an active UN role in facilitating Pyongyang's denuclearization process."
Dean Calma/IAEA
July 12, 2008
IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Non-Compliance
Report
In a study commissioned by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Pierre Goldschmidt, former Deputy Director-General for Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), outlines a new approach to strengthening the IAEA's hand in cases when states violate their safeguards agreements. Goldschmidt argues that the UN Security Council should pass a generic resolution laying out steps the Security Council would take to deal with any state found to be in violation of its safeguards obligations. Any state which violated its safeguards pact would be required to accept a broader inspection regime going well beyond the Additional Protocol until the IAEA was able to draw the conclusion that all of its nuclear facilities and materials were under safeguards. If the IAEA is unable to draw such a conclusion with 60 days, the state would be required to cease all its sensitive nuclear activities. Goldschmidt offers a draft text for the resolution and for the "Model Temporary Complementary Protocol" that defines the broader inspection regime, along with an article-by-article analysis.
Summer 2008
"Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
By William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova
Although projections of nuclear proliferation abound, they rarely are founded on empirical research or guided by theory. Even fewer studies are informed by a comparative perspective. The two books under review—The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy, by Jacques Hymans, and Nuclear Logics: Alternative Paths in East Asia and the Middle East, by Etel Solingen, are welcome exceptions to this general state of affairs, and represent the cutting edge of nonproliferation research. Both works challenge conventional conceptions of the sources of nuclear weapons decisions and offer new insights into why past predictions of rapid proliferation failed to materialize and why current prognoses about rampant proliferation are similarly flawed. While sharing a number of common features, including a focus on subsystemic determinants of national behavior, the books differ in their methodology, level of analysis, receptivity to multicausal explanations, and assumptions about decisionmaker rationality and the revolutionary nature of the decision. Where one author emphasizes the importance of the individual leader’s national identity conception in determining a state’s nuclear path, the other explains nuclear decisions primarily with regard to the political-economic orientation of the ruling coalition. Notwithstanding a tendency to overinterpret evidence, the books represent the best of contemporary social science research and provide compelling interpretations of nuclear proliferation dynamics of great relevance to scholars and policymakers alike.
AP Photo
June 13, 2008
Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order: The Role of the IAEA
Memorandum
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School and Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom
The high-level Commission of Eminent Persons advising the International Atomic Energy Agency concluded that meeting the current nuclear challenges and seizing the current opportunities will require a fundamentally reinvigorated global nuclear order, featuring a strengthened IAEA with "additional authority, resources, personnel, and technology." Without a "bold agenda" of steps to strengthen the nuclear order, the Commission warned that there were real risks that terrorists might get a nuclear bomb, that a nuclear accident might occur, or that, as the UN High-Level Panel warned, the world could suffer "a cascade of nuclear proliferation." Preventing such events, the Commission emphasized, is essential for nuclear energy to grow enough to contribute to mitigating climate change, making safety, security, and nonproliferation essential foundations for nuclear energy's future.
