NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AP Photo
October 7, 2008
"A Working Relationship"
Op-Ed, Baltimore Sun
By Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom and Andrew Newman, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom
"Today, the United States and Europe must respond to Russia's military behavior in Georgia and elsewhere in its former empire. But they must also maintain a working relationship with Russia to continue vital cooperation between Russian and U.S. experts to reduce nuclear weapons and keep them out of terrorists' hands....Preventing nuclear terrorism must be a top priority of U.S. national security policy, and securing global stockpiles of nuclear weapons and materials is the most effective way to achieve this."
AP Photo
September 23, 2008
"U.S., Russia Must Unite to Lessen Nuclear Dangers"
Op-Ed, The Washington Times
By Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom
Martin Malin argues in an Op-Ed for the Washington Times, that as the presidential nominees' debate on national security issues approaches, there is one issue on which both sides agree — preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation must be a top priority.
AP Photo
September 2008
The Next Chapter
Report
By Xenia Dormandy, Senior Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
The Belfer Center's Xenia Dormandy participated in the Pakistan Policy Working Group, which was convened in January 2008 to assess the state of U.S.-Pakistan relations and to offer ideas to the next U.S. President and his Administration on managing this critical partnership.
August 28, 2008
"Historic Barriers to Anglo-American Nuclear Cooperation"
Book Chapter
By Andrew Brown, Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom
Andrew Brown's chapter, "Historic Barriers to Anglo-American Nuclear Cooperation," has been published in the recent book US-UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years. The book is a joint publication from CSIS and Chatham House London examining the impact of the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement and its consequences.
August 22, 2008
Memo to President-elect McBama
Memorandum, Aspen Strategy Group
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
Graham Allison writes in a memo to a fictional President-elect McBama on the suject of nuclear terrorism, "You pledged that you would make preventing this catastrophe an organizing principle of your administration. This memo provides a brief outline of strategy and organization to fulfill that promise."
AP Photo
August 18, 2008
"Musharraf Exit May Affect U.S. Plans"
Media Feature
By Xenia Dormandy, Senior Associate, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Xenia Dormandy, Director of the Project on India and the Subcontinent, was interviewed for National Public Radio's All Things Considered on the impact of Musharraf's resignation for U.S. foreign policy.
August 14, 2008
"Strengthening our Strategy Against WMD"
Op-Ed, Boston Globe
By Dr. Ashton B. Carter, Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Harvard & Stanford Universities and The Honorable Robert G. Joseph, Senior Scholar, National Institute for Public Policy
Dr. Ashton B. Carter and Ambassador Robert G. Joseph discuss recommendations stemming from recommendations in final report of the review they co-chaired of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and other DOD efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction.
July 2008
"Denuclearization of the DPRK—A Role for the United Nations?"
Paper, volume 3
By Xiaohui (Anne) Wu, Associate, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom
"The denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues to be a source of considerable international concern. Yet, no coherent international framework has emerged to deal with this challenge in parallel with the regional mechanism of the six-party talks. With the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference set for 2010, appropriately addressing the DPRK nuclear issue is being identified as essential to maintaining the strength of the NPT. Can the United Nations (UN) afford to take a back seat in attempts at resolution?This article examines the potential of, and prospects for, an active UN role in facilitating Pyongyang's denuclearization process. Anne Wu's paper examines the potential of, and prospects for, an active UN role in facilitating Pyongyang's denuclearization process."
AP Photo
July 19, 2008
"Bush's U-turn Toward Common Sense"
Op-Ed, Los Angeles Times
By Graham Allison, Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; Douglas Dillon Professor of Government; Faculty Chair, Dubai Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School
Graham Allison applauds the decision by the Bush administration to send U.S. Undersecretary of State William Burns to the European Union meeting with Iran on Saturday (July 19). This "flip-flop toward reality," Allison says, "represents a major step in overcoming fierce internal struggles within the U.S. and Iran that had left both stuck at stalemate."
Summer 2008
"The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn’t: Soviet Military Buildup in the 1970s—A Research Note"
Journal Article, International Security, issue 1, volume 33
By Pavel Podvig
The Soviet strategic modernization program of the 1970s was one of the most consequential developments of the Cold War. Deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles and the dramatic increase in the number of strategic warheads in the Soviet arsenal created a sense of vulnerability in the United States that was, to a large degree, responsible for the U.S. military buildup of the late 1970s and early 1980s and the escalation of Cold War tensions during that period. U.S. assessments concluded that the Soviet Union was seeking to achieve a capability to fight and win a nuclear war. Estimates of missile accu¬racy and silo hardness provided by the U.S. intelligence community led many in the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union was building a strategic missile force capable of destroying most U.S. missiles in a counterforce strike and of surviving a subsequent nuclear exchange. Soviet archival documents that have recently become available demonstrate that this conclusion was wrong. The U.S. estimates substantially overestimated the accuracy of the Soviet Union's missiles and the degree of silo reinforcement. As the data demonstrate, the Soviet missile force did not have the capability to launch a successful first strike. Moreover, the data strongly suggest that the Soviet Union never attempted to acquire a first-strike capability, concentrating instead on strategies based on retaliation.
