The overarching question imparting urgency to this exploration is: Can U.S.-Russian contention in cyberspace cause the two nuclear superpowers to stumble into war? In considering this question we were constantly reminded of recent comments by a prominent U.S. arms control expert: At least as dangerous as the risk of an actual cyberattack, he observed, is cyber operations’ “blurring of the line between peace and war.” Or, as Nye wrote, “in the cyber realm, the difference between a weapon and a non-weapon may come down to a single line of code, or simply the intent of a computer program’s user.”
In this MTA Seminar, special guest Sulfikar Amir will discuss how vulnerability became hidden in the Fukushima nuclear power station and how that led to a meltdown after the nuclear power facility was struck by a tsunami. Using the sociotechnical perspective, the presentation examines the implication of the Fukushima reactor design on the ability of the system to withstand the shock. A broader analysis on the institutional structure of the Japanese nuclear industry is also presented to show how vulnerability was a product of institutionalised ignorance.