The Nonproliferation Paradox: Why Efforts to Limit the Number of Nuclear States May Backfire

About

Efforts to control nuclear proliferation are currently at the top of the international security agenda, with the strategies advocated ranging from regime change to outright bribery. One dominant approach is to tailor the nonproliferation strategy to the particular motivations of the proliferator. In other words, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, policymakers need to understand what motivates states to acquire such weapons. This strategy seems logical: recognizing local variation, governments can avoid a one-size-fits-all approach that may be ineffective or even counterproductive in some cases.  But, like a stone cast in water, nonproliferation strategies can cause ripple effects—with dramatic and dangerous consequences. Policies narrowly focused on dissuading one state from acquiring nuclear weapons can unintentionally touch off proliferation elsewhere. 

In this presentation, Professor Oakes examines how strategies designed to deal with one type of proliferator can backfire with other types of proliferators. She then explores how this dynamic operated in a specific case: India's nuclear program in the mid-1960s.

Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.