Brittle Times for the Transatlantic Relationship

From the continued relevance and financial sustainability of NATO, to the political relevance of the European Union and the importance of the Paris Climate Change agreement, the new American administration is willing to question both long-standing, normative anchors of the global security architecture, as well as more recent achievements of international diplomacy. Now, with the unilateral decision to repeal the Iran nuclear deal by the United States, a fault line has opened up across the Atlantic with consequences so far reaching the German chancellor has deemed it a “question of war and peace.” Make no mistake: With this American administration, we have surpassed the transatlantic crises of old that were predominantly marked by differences of political opinion between parties on either side or among European allies.

This is a different time. The George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations treated Europe with relatively benign neglect, reducing the number of U.S.-EU Summits and focusing – as President Obama did – first on an ill-timed “reset with Russia” and then a “pivot to Asia.” But neither leader waivered in his understanding of the United States as the leading power among powers, made “exceptional” not by its own might alone, but based on its robust network of allies across the globe while China grew and Russia extended its capacity as a spoiler in the international system. The Obama era national security strategies underlined a deep commitment to the decades-old allied transatlantic relationship in security, economic, and yes, also in values terms. Compare the Hobbesian worldview articulated by the once assumed “adults in the room” of the Trump administration, former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and former economic advisor Gary Cohn, who – in their dog-eat-dog scenarios published in “The Wall Street Journal” – made clear that American values would not longer be the cornerstone of American foreign policy, stripping that policy of its moral power.

President Trump is a transactionalist unburdened by the lessons of history, and his current foreign policy team are taking a series of uncalculated risks tempting far-reaching global consequences. The coming months will see an even more assertive Trump administration, buoyed by rising approval numbers and a strong U.S. economy. Using the language of rivalry, this administration will attempt to split Europe on issues relating to secondary sanctions against Iran, tariffs, and possibly energy policy. Reports of the president’s dismissive rhetoric during the spring 2018 visit of German Chancellor Merkel, and the demand by America’s newly-arrived ambassador to Berlin that German companies “wind down operations [in Iran] immediately,” are all hallmarks of the harsh tone European countries are likely to face across the policy spectrum in the months – possibly years – ahead.

For too long, Europeans failed to take this administration at face value, preferring to rely on U.S. institutions and the realities of a globalized, co-dependent economy to keep this president in check – perhaps no country more so than Germany. This is in part explained through the lens of history, as a country indebted not once but twice to U.S. interventions that shaped its future from the Marshall Plan to reunification and in part by current, real world co-dependencies in defense and economic matters. Though the chancellor has repeatedly thrown down a moral gauntlet, highlighting the necessity to abide by Western values, she has been rebuked by the Trump White House. As James Traub has pointed out, the “mental transition (away from the United States as protector and friend of first resort) will take far longer than the political one.” Sensing a deeper shift in the relationship, the writers of all German editorial pages are calling for the country’s leadership to “join the resistance,” (“Der Spiegel”) against this administration. And indeed, Germany and Europe should embrace their emergent strategic options.

First, there is the pursuit of a rigorous (and it will not be easy) reform agenda of the European Union itself on key issues, including financial policy, energy, foreign policy, and defense. While European cohesion is threatened by the rising tide of populism and illiberal democracies in the EU’s midst and on tis borders, from Hungary to Poland, to a tilting Czech Republic and an embattled Serbia and Russia further East, core member states can and will need to move ahead in these areas – and quickly – to restore their citizen’s faith in the very basic promises of the West, that of physical security and economic stability. The last six months have proven that progress is possible: From the Permanent Structured Cooperation agreement on foreign and defense policy issues, to discussions on the use of qualified majority voting in the Council on related issues, to its diplomatic strategy in Washington to counter trade tariffs, to the united front on the Iran question – the European Union can present and defend its own interests, provided it musters sufficient political will. Should reform efforts succeed at pace, they could have a beneficial impact on the relationship with Washington. Unity in these policy areas equals strength, and strength is what President Trump respects.

Second, the integrated global challenges we face today will affect European countries to a disproportionate degree and hence demand action and new partnerships. Conflicts across the Middle East and Africa resulting from territorial conflict (Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo) or from climate change and economic factors (including water and resource shortages) will have direct spillover effects on bordering EU and NATO countries and beyond. Economic and technological challenges emerging from China already challenge Europe’s slow-moving industrial and digital policies. Russia’s success in dividing Europe is linked to weakened European civic institutions. Tackling these challenges will require greater internal cohesion and creativity, but it will also require an increasingly unified voice (or set of leading voices) within the UN and the WTO and with new partners on the basis of a defined strategy, including Persian Gulf countries, India, and Japan.

Finally, European countries and Germany in particular need a more holistic and practical approach to the transatlantic relationship – one that goes beyond the corridors of power in Washington. The Trumpian view of transatlantic relations is not monolithically echoed across the vast landscapes of the United States, as Atlantik-Brücke’s YouGov survey points out. As mayors across the Atlantic collaborate on climate change mitigation and migrant integration as news outlets on either side form strategic business partnerships to uphold the freedom of the press; as France offers itself up as a haven for American scientists; as German companies invest in mitigating deficiencies in public education in South Carolina; as the German model informs prison reform in Massachusetts, we see the value of shared transatlantic public policy solutions beyond the classic areas of security and defense policy. Here, Atlantik-Brücke can play an important role by inspiring a more practical understanding of solutions toward the shared Western challenges of strengthening vibrant, civically engaged societies and addressing the future of work and education in the 21st century.

Of course, efforts to work with Washington must and will continue. Coordinated, diplomatic efforts to lobby Congress had an impact on U.S. sanctions policy toward Russia. Congress itself has worked, where it can, to rein in this President – and the mid-term elections in November might strengthen its ability to check his power and influence. European should continue making their voices heard. In the meantime, not all is lost. European cohesion and a more strategic, joint approach to relations with the U.S. will be elemental over the coming months and years. If successful, these efforts will serve to redefine the West and the transatlantic relationship for the 21st century.