The Future of NATO

NATO has been a crucial element of the post war international system in the globe’s northern hemisphere. It not only preserved peace but also provided the indispensable framework for the advance of democracy, Western Europe’s integration and the rise of the prosperous transatlantic economy that in turn brought forth globalization.

Whether NATO has a future amidst the challenges of the present era depends on several factors. First and foremost, NATO must survive the Trump Administration, whatever its duration. A Harvard Kennedy School study by Douglas Lute and Nicholas Burns rightly pointed to President Trump’s lack of leadership as NATO’s most significant problem. He has challenged NATO by repeatedly questioning its very core, the assistance clause of Article V, and by denigrating Allies while at the same time cozying up to autocrats, among them Vladimir Putin, NATO’s adversary. These attacks are an essential part of his attempt to tear down an order of multilateral rules and institutions that had been built up by US administrations after World War II.

To counteract and neutralize Trump’s destructive impact a continuous  and joint effort by the allies is necessary to mobilize the still existing support for NATO in the US  Congress, to cooperate with the military establishment that continues to adhere to a traditional NATO policy, and to reinforce, where possible, the American public’s  still existing majority preference for a strong US engagement in NATO. Such an effort must include increased allied defense contributions where Trump’s complaints about Europe’s insufficiencies had, in fact, been justified.

Secondly, NATO must also adequately adapt its posture to the new security threats.  Given Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in East Ukraine, NATO has to strengthen not only its classical defense but be better prepared for the kind of hybrid warfare that Russia applied in Ukraine. Of equal if not greater importance is an effort to defend against and be able to respond with cyberattacks. Russia’s cyber intervention in the 2016 US elections and the Brexit referendum demonstrate what momentous political gains can be achieved without a shot being fired and at a cost below the price of a fighter jet. Of course, the vulnerability of the West’s open society goes beyond politics and extends to the different parts of critical infrastructure necessary to its functioning that must be protected.

NATO’s future depends, third, on its ability to be geopolitically forward looking. Its long-term strategy will have to be based on the assumption that the American-Chinese rivalry will become the defining conflict in the international politics of the future. Hence it must be in the West’s overriding interest that in such a confrontation Russia - given its resources and geographic extension - not be driven as a satellite into China’s orbit- a likelihood increased by Russia’s continuing demographic, social and economic decline. This requires an imaginative and patient application of NATO’s double track approach developed first in the Harmel Exercise of 1967, that combines defense with détente and cooperative initiatives vis-a-vas Russia. These could include further developing the Minsk Agreement (tying a reduction of sanctions to genuine progress), confidence building measures in the conventional arms field, and the resumption of nuclear arms control. It would also be helpful to unequivocally postpone the question of Ukraine’s and Georgia’s NATO membership while helping both countries economically and through military assistance to remain viable and independent.

Finally, NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan that began in 2003 should be brought to an end by supporting American efforts to bring about a political solution of a war that cannot be won militarily.