To compete and thrive in the 21st century, democracies, and the United States in particular, must develop new national security and economic strategies that address the geopolitics of information. In the 20th century, market capitalist democracies geared infrastructure, energy, trade, and even social policy to protect and advance that era’s key source of power—manufacturing. In this century, democracies must better account for information geopolitics across all dimensions of domestic policy and national strategy.
Speaker: Melissa Willard-Foster, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Vermont
Contrary to the dominant view that instability makes targets of coercive pressure more likely to concede, the speaker will argue that instability prolongs their resistance. Leaders' policies reflect their domestic political interests, thus, conceding to policy change invites political costs. The more powerful a leader's domestic opposition, the more likely it can benefit when the leader is forced to make a costly concession. Although resistance may be costly too, targets can more easily mitigate these costs than they can convince the challenger to change its demands. As a result, instability is more likely to encourage a target's resistance. The speaker tests her argument on Libya's rapprochement with the West, showing that Qaddafi refused to surrender the Pan Am flight 103 bombing suspects due to domestic political costs. It was only after Qaddafi recovered his power and the United States softened its terms that he complied, which paved the way for the 2003 deal.
Please join us! Coffee and tea provided. Everyone is welcome, but admittance will be on a first come–first served basis.
For more information, email the International Security Program Assistant at susan_lynch@harvard.edu.