Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Conceal or Reveal? Managing Clandestine Military Capabilities in Peacetime Competition

| Winter 2019/20

Summary

In long-term peacetime military competitions, states face a trade-off between signaling their secret military capabilities to gain political advantage and concealing them to protect warfighting effectiveness. States are more likely to signal when the capability in question can potentially be duplicated and when the adversary’s ability to respond with countermeasures is in doubt.

Want to Read More?

The full text of this publication is available via MIT Press.
Read Full Article
For more information on this publication: Belfer Communications Office
For Academic Citation:

Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long, “Conceal or Reveal? Managing Clandestine Military Capabilities in Peacetime Competition,” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 3 (Winter 2019/20), pp. 48–83, doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00367.

The Authors

Austin Long

Recommended
In the Spotlight
RSS
While offsets are imperfect, they may be necessary to reach ambitious short-term environmental goals.
More on Energy
Danielle F. Jung and Dara Kay Cohen argue that lynching emerges when neither the state nor its challengers have a monopoly over legitimate authority.
More on International Security
Western models partly inspired the creation of Special Operation Command and Military Police and the development of private military companies.
More from Russia Matters
Most Viewed

Tags