Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security
Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China
Summary
China's growing nuclear arsenal threatens to erode the United States' damage-limitation capability—its ability to destroy Chinese forces and thereby significantly reduce the damage that an all-out Chinese nuclear attack would inflict on the United States. Nevertheless, the United States should not attempt to preserve this capability. Doing so is technologically infeasible, would not add to the U.S. nuclear deterrent, would heighten tensions with China, and would increase the risk of nuclear escalation in a crisis.
One of the authors, Charles L. Glaser, has written a policy brief based on this article, "Forgoing U.S. Damage-Limitation against China's Nuclear Weapons"
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For Academic Citation:
Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter. “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China.” Quarterly Journal: International Security, vol. 41. no. 1. (Summer 2016): 49-98 .
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China's growing nuclear arsenal threatens to erode the United States' damage-limitation capability—its ability to destroy Chinese forces and thereby significantly reduce the damage that an all-out Chinese nuclear attack would inflict on the United States. Nevertheless, the United States should not attempt to preserve this capability. Doing so is technologically infeasible, would not add to the U.S. nuclear deterrent, would heighten tensions with China, and would increase the risk of nuclear escalation in a crisis.
One of the authors, Charles L. Glaser, has written a policy brief based on this article, "Forgoing U.S. Damage-Limitation against China's Nuclear Weapons"
Want to Read More?
The full text of this publication is available via the original publication source.- Recommended
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