Can Investigations Improve Scientific Advice? The Case of the ABM

Not since Franklin Roosevelt's draft law cleared the House of Representatives by one vote in the summer of 1941 had a President been put to so stern a challenge by Congress on a major question of national defense. Richard Nixon had staked his prestige on a no-compromise commitment to the view that a beginning on the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system was " absolutely essential" to America's security. Precisely half the U.S. Senate said he was wrong. In the showdown last week, Mr. Nixon won . . . . But the hairbreadth margin of his victory--51 to 50 on the critical test vote—put the President and the military on notice that their will in defense matters, unchallenged for a generation, would no longer pass without question.

So began the Newsweek story 1 in August 1969 telling of the dead-heat climax of a controversy which had been growing in United States governmental, defense and scientific advisory circles for a decade; within the year prior to the vote in the Senate, the public debate had reached a level of intensity and acrimony which was unparalleled for a discussion of a weapons issue. Now, in the spring of 1972, two and a half years and $4 billion later, the issue remains muted, awaiting the outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). It is, however, certain to arise again, either in questioning decisions provisionally reached at SALT or in reopening the debate over whether or not to continue deployment of the ABM system.