Journal Article - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Weapons Lab
An Interview with Matthew S. Meselson
Note
For more information on the "Five Minutes to Midnight" special issue, read the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January 17, 2007 news announcement: http://www.thebulletin.org/weekly-highlight/20070117.html
"The lack of transparency in U.S. biodefense work is fostering a widespread perception that we are secretly developing novel threat agents and exploring novel bioweapons concepts. This constitutes a kind of psychological proliferation that risks eroding the constraints against military and paramilitary use of biological weapons. And aside from security considerations, secrecy in biological research will impede rather than foster the discovery and development of practical methods of prophylaxis and therapy of infective disease."
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For Academic Citation:
Meselson, Matthew S.. “Weapons Lab.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 63. no. 1. (January / February 2007): 49-55 .
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